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Executive summary 
The purpose of this report is to further explore the cooperation between computer security incident 
response teams (CSIRTs) (in particular national and governmental CSIRTs) and law enforcement (LE) by 
adding the important dimension of their interaction with the judiciary (prosecutors and judges). 
This report follows two reports that ENISA published in 2017: Tools and methodologies to support 
cooperation between CSIRTs and law enforcement (ENISA, 2017), which focused on technical aspects and 
Improving cooperation between CSIRTs and law enforcement: Legal and organisational aspects (ENISA, 
2017a), which focused on the legal and organisational issues of cooperation; both are available on the 
ENISA website. 
This report aims to support the cooperation between CSIRTs and LE, as well as their interaction with the 
judiciary in their fight against cybercrime, by providing information on the legal, organisational, technical 
and cultural aspects, identifying current shortcomings and making recommendations to further enhance 
cooperation. The geographical coverage is mainly the EU and European Free Trade Association (EFTA). 
The data for this report was collected via desk research, interviews with subject-matter experts and an 
online survey. The data showed that CSIRTs, LE and the judiciary are characterised by significant 
differences in roles and structure. The kind of information to which CSIRTs and LE have access is different, 
this is one of the primary reasons why sharing information between them is paramount to respond to 
cybercrime. Across Member States different models/frameworks of interaction exist among the three 
communities (CSIRTs, LE and the judiciary). Overall CSIRTs interact more with LE rather than with the 
judiciary. CSIRTs offer support to LE to collect and analyse different types of evidence. CSIRTs are rarely 
called as witnesses in courts but the material they collect during the incident handling might be used to 
decide on (cyber) crime cases. 
Although the cooperation and interaction across the CSIRT, LE and judiciary communities work well in 
principle, there are still some challenges to be faced. In particular, some legal aspects are seen as the 
biggest challenge with issues such the diversity of the legal frameworks, data retention, the sharing of 
personal data (including internet protocol (IP) addresses) and the confidentiality around criminal 
investigations as well as evidential admissibility of digital evidence.  
Core recommendations to improve the aspects of the cooperation between CSIRTs and LE and their 
interaction with the judiciary are as follows. 
 ENISA, Europol EC3, the European agency for the enhancement of judicial cooperation (Eurojust) and 
the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL): to facilitate joint training across 
the three communities (CSIRTs, LE and the judiciary) on aspects of their cooperation among the EU and 
EFTA addressing CSIRTs, LE and judiciary needs and engaging with designated CSIRTs in the MS and 
national police forces beyond the EU, as appropriate. 
 National/governmental CSIRTs, LE and possibly prosecutor services: to work together towards a 
better mutual understanding of the strengths, needs and limitations of the three communities  in 
relation to the sharing information, also by using segregation (or separation) of duties (SoD) matrices. 
 National/governmental CSIRTs, LE and possibly prosecutor services: to appoint liaison officers to 
facilitate the cooperation and the interaction. 
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 National/governmental CSIRTs, LE and possibly prosecutor services: to investigate how the tools they 
use can be further improved to better receive the information provided by other communities and to 
better formulate their request for information addressed to the other communities. 
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 Introduction 
 Purpose 
As stated in the Council of the European Union Final report on the seventh round of mutual evaluations on 
‘The practical implementation and operation of the European policies on prevention and combating 
cybercrime’ (Council of the European Union, 2017, p. 67), ‘CSIRTs do not have the powers of an LEA (law-
enforcement agency) vis-à-vis private subjects, but regarding attacks of a criminal nature (not all cyber 
incidents are criminal acts), have an important role in supporting the investigations, as they can help to 
provide information and to secure electronic evidence (e-evidence). It is therefore very important for this 
purpose that CSIRTs have a good cooperation with the LE, as obtaining information and evidence 
effectively is essential for the investigation of cyber-attacks, considering that data are very dynamic and 
can be lost easily’. 
Collecting knowledge on current cooperation between CSIRTs and LE communities is a key step to enhance 
it. While the 2017 ENISA reports on CSIRT and LE cooperation (ENISA, 2017) (ENISA, 2017a) aimed to 
better understand in particular the legal/organisational and technical aspects of the cooperation, the 
purpose of this report is to further explore this cooperation by adding the important dimension of their 
interaction with the judiciary (prosecutors and judges). 
 Background of the report 
In 2017, ENISA published two complementary reports addressing the cooperation between CSIRT and LE to 
fight against cybercrime, one on legal and organisational aspects, the other on technical aspects. 
The 2017 ENISA report on Improving cooperation between CSIRTs and law enforcement: Legal and 
organisational aspects (ENISA, 2017a) confirmed that CSIRTs and LE often exchange information during the 
incident handling/investigations both formally and informally and that trust is the key success factor for 
the cooperation. It showed that there are challenges related to the variety of legal systems and legal 
provisions in the different Member States; adding further complexity is the diversity of communication 
channels between the various Member States that represents an issue for effective crime fighting. 
The 2017 ENISA report Tools and methodologies to support cooperation between CSIRTs and law 
enforcement (ENISA, 2017) also confirmed that CSIRTs and LE exchange information often during incident 
handling/investigations both formally and informally and that trust is also the key success factor for the 
cooperation. It highlighted that despite CSIRTs and LE having different objectives and methods for 
collecting and processing information, there is, between the two communities, an increased reciprocal 
understanding of needs. Furthermore, according to the data collected for that report, CSIRTs are more 
inclined to use open-source tools (e.g. the malware information-sharing platform (MISP)) and the 
information sharing between CSIRTs and LE is more ad hoc than systematic. 
As highlighted in the 6th ENISA/EC3 workshop for national and governmental CSIRTs and their LE 
counterparts (The Hague, 16-17 October 2017) (ENISA, 6th ENISA/EC3 Workshop, n.a.), the theme of 
interaction across CSIRTs, LE and judiciary (prosecutors and judges) is extremely important. In the context 
of the fight against (cyber) crime, indeed, it is not sufficient that evidence is collected, but it is also 
necessary that it is admissible in a criminal trial. Compliance with technical and legal requirements is 
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needed for the admissibility of evidence, notably adherence to the criminal procedure requirements is of 
paramount importance. 
The ENISA programming document 2018-2020 includes ‘Objective 4.2. CSIRT and other NIS community 
building’. Under this objective, ‘Output O.4.2.2 — Support the fight against cybercrime and collaboration 
between CSIRTs and LEA’ has the goal to ‘to build upon the progress ENISA has made in supporting 
different operational communities (e.g. CSIRTs, LE, European [Financial Institutes – Information Sharing 
and Analysis Centre] FI-ISAC) to enhance mutually satisfactory ways to collaborate and support exchange 
of good practices among different stakeholders in operational communities in Europe’ (ENISA, 2017b, p. 
43). 
This report is a continuation of previous ENISA work and it contributes to the implementation of the ENISA 
programming document 2018-2020, Output O.4.2.2, in particular to what is planned for as ‘Current 
cooperation between CSIRT and LEA community and on possible ways to further enhance their 
cooperation’. 
 Report objectives and scope 
1.3.1 Report objectives 
The 2017 ENISA reports on CSIRT and LE cooperation as well as previous ENISA work in the area focused 
only on these two communities: CSIRT and LE. The objectives of these past ENISA reports were to analyse 
how these two communities cooperate and share information both from the legal/organisational and the 
technical point of view. They identify challenges to the cooperation (such as limitations in the availability of 
specialised personnel) and propose ways to overcome them (such as to place liaison officers at both ends, 
to build and maintain a centralised repository of tools and methodologies and to invest further in joint 
training). 
They gather further knowledge on the cooperation between CSIRTs and LE by also looking at the 
dimension of how their interaction with the judiciary helps to reach a better and more complete 
understanding of the dynamics, synergies and challenges that characterise their cooperation in the fight 
against cybercrime. 
The main objectives of this report are as follows. 
 Gather further knowledge and discuss the current (1) cooperation between CSIRTs and LE by adding 
the dimension of their interaction with prosecutors and judges as far as it concerns their fight 
against cybercrime. 
 Provide information on the relevant legal and policy framework shaping this cooperation and this 
interaction. 
 Provide information on the information flow across the three communities (CSIRTs and LE and the 
judiciary). 
 Provide information on the tools and methods used for the cooperation between CSIRTs and LE and 
their interaction with the judiciary. 
                                                          
(1) Data collection cut-off date for this report: 28 August 2018. 
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 Identify current challenges to the cooperation between CSIRTs and LE and their interaction with the 
judiciary. 
 Formulate and propose recommendations to improve the cooperation between CSIRTs and LE and 
their interaction with the judiciary. 
1.3.2 Report scope 
The report focuses on aspects of cooperation between CSIRTs (national/governmental CSIRTs) and LE, and 
their cooperation with the judiciary (prosecutors and judges). 
The geographical coverage is limited to the EU (European Union, 2017) and EFTA  (EFTA, n.d.) (2). (See also 
(ENISA, 2015b)). This does not mean however that all these countries are covered in the report and that no 
reference to other countries outside the EU and EFTA is made in the report. Possible specific differences 
among the EU and EFTA, or between the EU and the United States, or the EU and Asia, also fall outside the 
scope of this report. 
The report does not target a specific sector; considerations made can apply to cooperation between CSIRTs 
and LEs and the interaction with the judiciary to fight against cybercrime (which includes crimes where a 
computer is an object and crimes where a computer is a tool of crime) in all sectors (from finance to 
energy, from transport to health). 
Although some considerations might be made incidentally in this report on the general cooperation 
between LE and judiciary, this is not the focus of the report, which looks at such aspect only as far as they 
are relevant for reaching a better understanding of the cooperation and interaction between the CSIRTs, 
LE and judiciary community to respond to cybercrime. 
The fight against terrorism, cyberwarfare, cyber espionage by nation states, as well as the enforcement of 
rights in civil and administrative courts, are outside the scope of this report, although some of the 
considerations developed might be extended to them. 
This report does not aim to present an exhaustive set of instantiations of cooperation between CSIRTs and 
LEs and of their interaction with the judiciary, rather it seeks to facilitate the drawing of meaningful 
conclusions for the purpose of enhancing such cooperation and interaction. 
 Target audience 
The intended target audience are CSIRTs (mainly national and governmental CSIRTs but not limited to 
them) LE, prosecutors, judges, as well as individuals and organisations with an interest in NIS. 
Additionally, policy and law makers may benefit from select aspects of analysis as well as the 
recommendations of this report, as they prepare policies and legislation for enhancing the cooperation 
between CSIRTs and LEs and their interaction with the judiciary. 
                                                          
(2) In this report ‘n.d.’ stands for ‘no date’ and it is used in the references when no date could be found for the cited source. 
Cooperation between CSIRTs and Law Enforcement: interaction with the Judiciary 
  November 2018  
   
13 
 Methodology 
The methodology chosen for this report and the way this methodology is presented in this chapter are 
largely inspired by Chapter 2 of the 2017 ENISA reports on Improving cooperation between CSIRTs and law 
enforcement: Legal and organisational aspects (ENISA, 2017a) and on Tools and methodologies to support 
cooperation between CSIRTs and law enforcement (ENISA, 2017). 
In keeping with these two 2017 ENISA reports, data for this report was collected by desk research, 
interviews with subject-matter experts and an online survey. A qualitative methodological approach has 
mainly been used due to the rather new field addressed; however, some quantitative data were also 
collected: an online survey was conducted to validate and complement the findings from the desk research 
and the interviews. 
 Information collection instruments used 
2.1.1 Desk research 
A first desk research was conducted based on publicly available information sources, including ENISA 
publications. The findings from this desk research were particularly useful for the scoping of the report and 
for drafting the questionnaire to support the interviews. 
Supplementary desk research was conducted to address certain specific topics that the project team 
deemed appropriate to examine in more depth following the analysis of the data collected via the 
interviews. These included topics such as the recent discussion on access to the WHOIS database (DB) by 
LE. 
Concerning the legal research, legal material (including some case-law) for instance fundamental principles 
of criminal procedure, comparative criminal law and procedure, and European law, was consulted. 
2.1.2 Interviews and written replies to the questionnaire 
A total of 21 subject-matter experts from 11 Member States replied to the questionnaire either via 
structured interviews or with written replies. Of the respondents, nine were experts from the CSIRTs 
community (mainly but not exclusively from national/governmental CSIRTs), seven from the LE community 
(mainly national police but also one from a local police force), and five from the judiciary community. This 
is in addition to the respondents of the online survey. 
  
Cooperation between CSIRTs and Law Enforcement: interaction with the Judiciary 
  November 2018  
   
14 
Figure 1 — Overview of communities of respondents to the interviews conducted for this report 
 
 
A questionnaire (see Annex E — Samples of questionnaires to support the interviews) was prepared to 
support the interviews. Most questions were open. For all questions, including yes/no questions, 
interviewees could add comments and additional information. 
The interviews included some questions common to CSIRTs, LE and the judiciary, followed by a specific set 
of questions for each community. 
A pilot phone interview was conducted in June 2018. In addition, the questions were tested with an 
additional respondent to verify its suitability to be answered in writing. In addition to data for the report, 
the two pilot interviews served as a means to collect feedback on how the interview was received and 
avoided, for instance, unclear or inappropriate questions that might have decreased the willingness of the 
respondents to provide answers. The pilot interviews were also useful to verify the time to allocate to the 
interview. 
The interviews were carried out from June to mid-July 2018. They were conducted either face-to-face or 
via phone and they lasted around 1 hour each. Interviewees received the questions in advance and in most 
cases, they had the opportunity to review the notes taken by the interviewers (project team) with their 
replies and validate them. 
Of the 21 respondents, five asked to reply to the questions in writing as this was more convenient for 
them. 
Some interviewees, or representatives of the same organisation of interviewees, also completed the online 
survey. 
While the questionnaire developed to collect data for the 2017 ENISA reports focused only on CSIRT and LE 
cooperation, the questionnaire developed to collect data for this 2018 report addresses also their 
interaction with the judiciary and aims to collect more in-depth information on some topics, such as joint 
training. 
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The interview questions started with a set of common questions for all participants to answer, followed by 
three sets of specific questions for CSIRTs, LE or judiciary to answer respectively. In comparison to the 
interviews conducted for the 2017 ENISA reports on CSIRTs and LE cooperation, the interviews for this 
report covered inter alia the additional dimension of the interaction with the judiciary. 
2.1.3 Online survey 
An online survey was conducted to collect additional data to validate and further substantiate some 
findings. It was composed of 16 questions (see Annex F — Questions in the online survey), all with closed 
answers and some with the possibility to add additional comments and provide more details related to the 
answers. 
The survey was developed using  EUSurvey (3), a survey tool which is ‘supported by the European 
Commission’s ISA programme, which promotes interoperability solutions for European public 
administrations’ (European Commission, n.d.(b)). 
The invitation to complete the survey was disseminated as follows. 
 A closed ENISA mailing list of European national and governmental CSIRTs, which includes around 60 
teams. 
 Via Europol (Europol, n.d.) to the European Union cybercrime task force (EUCTF), which is ‘composed 
of the heads of the designated national cybercrime units throughout the EU Member States and 
Europol. The EUCTF (4) is an interagency group formed to allow the heads of cybercrime units, 
Europol, [the International Criminal Police Commission] Interpol, the European Commission, Eurojust, 
Norway, Switzerland and Iceland to discuss the strategic and operational issues related to cybercrime 
investigations and prosecutions within the EU and beyond’ (Council of the European Union, 2017b, p. 
13). 
 Via Eurojust (Eurojust, n.d.) to the judicial authorities of the European judicial cybercrime network, 
which is composed by ‘at least one national representative of the judicial authorities with appropriate 
expertise to participate in the network’ and was set up to ‘provide a centre of specialised expertise 
supporting judicial authorities, i.e. prosecutors and judges dealing with cybercrime, cyber-enabled 
crime and investigations in cyberspace” (5) (Council of the European Union, 2016, p. 2). 
 
The survey was launched in July 2018 and was open for around 2 weeks. The data collected via the online 
survey was used to validate the data collected through the desk research and the interviews and used to 
produce some statistical graphs. 
                                                          
(3)       https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/home/welcome 
(4) In execution of the JHA Council conclusions of 27-28 November 2008 and of the 26 April 2010, Europol together with the European Commission and the 
EU Member States have set up the European Union cybercrime task force (EUCTF) composed of the Heads of the designated national cybercrime units 
throughout the EU Member States and Europol. The EUCTF is an interagency group formed to allow the Heads of Cybercrime Units, Europol, the European 
Commission and Eurojust to discuss the strategic and operational issues related to cybercrime investigations and prosecutions within the EU and beyond. 
(5) Terms of Reference of EUCTF. 
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A total of 36 replies were received. Of these, 34 were from EU Member States (European Union, 2017) and 
EFTA countries (EFTA, n.d.), one from a non-EU/non-EFTA country and one from another organisation. It 
must be noted that the two replies from non-EU/EFTA countries were somewhat in line with the other 
replies received and have been used to formulate general considerations; however, the graphs in this 
report were developed based only on the 34 replies from EU and EFTA respondents, to ensure full 
consistency with the geographical scope of the report. 
Of the 34 EU and EFTA respondents, seven respondents were from the CSIRT community, 17 from the LE 
community, one belonged to both of these communities, and nine were from the judiciary (eight 
prosecutors and one judge). An overview of the composition of the EU and EFTA respondents, based on 
the community they belong to, is presented hereinafter in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 — Overview of communities of respondents to the online survey conducted for this report 
 
 
Most respondents replied to all questions, despite most questions not being mandatory. Some 
respondents used the comment boxes to provide extra information. 
 Data used to develop the recommendations 
The recommendations in this report (see Chapter 5) have been developed based on research findings of 
this report. 
 Selection and classification of the stakeholders 
The project team discussed and agreed on criteria to use to ensure contribution of a wide range of 
stakeholders. The following criteria (which were not prioritised but considered as equal) were used for the 
selections of interviewees: 
 CSIRTs/LE/judiciary community 
 geographical location 
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 size of country (population) 
 level of maturity in CSIRT-LE cooperation 
 level of CSIRT maturity (6) 
 size of the CSIRT 
 common law/civil law legal tradition. 
 Contribution by subject-matter experts 
ENISA selected eight external subject-matter experts from the list of NIS experts compiled following the 
ENISA CEI (Ref. ENISA M-CEI-17-T01) (ENISA, n.d.(b)). 
Six of them contributed to this report by supporting the data collection and the drafting while two were 
reviewers. The two CEI experts contributing as reviewers reviewed this report in several rounds including 
the first draft in April 2018, an intermediate draft in June 2018, the semi-final and the final draft in 
August 2018. They reviewed it in addition to ENISA reviewers and other external reviewers. 
All eight experts contributed ad personam. 
These experts contributed inter alia with their expertise in NIS aspects of cybercrime, including but not 
limited to CSIRT and law cooperation, operational cooperation, information sharing to handle incidents 
and to fight against cybercrime. 
                                                          
(6) On CSIRT maturity, see (ENISA, n.d.(a)). 
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 CSIRTs, LE and the judiciary: framework, information flow and tools 
This chapter gives an overview of select legal provisions which have an influence on the rules governing 
the criminal procedures, including the admissibility of digital evidence. This chapter also discusses in detail 
the roles, structures and strengths of CSIRTs, LE and the judiciary and explores the current interaction and 
the information flow and the tools used. 
 Some general remarks 
Below some preliminary remarks are made related to the context surrounding the cooperation between 
CSIRTs and LE and their interaction and information flow with the judiciary. 
3.1.1 Criminal procedures: non-adversarial versus adversarial 
‘The Member State judicial systems are very diverse, reflecting differences in national judicial traditions 
(European Justice, n.d.(a)) and the legal traditions have an influence on the various areas of law. 
Concerning criminal procedural law, a distinction should be made between the non-adversarial system 
(also called, inquisitorial system), typical of civil law tradition, and the adversarial system (also called 
adversary system), typical of common law countries, (Delmas Marty & Spencer, 2004). 
In an adversarial system (or adversary system) a criminal trial is conceived as a conflict or dispute. Each of 
the parties supports a contrary position. In these systems the oral evidence is of fundamental importance 
and the method of taking such evidence is based on the so-called cross examination. Although there are 
exceptions, in such a system the judge does not tend to play an active role in the collection of evidence. 
The judge must in fact guarantee respect for fairness and equality and be neutral with respect to the 
parties. The decisions of the judge set precedents. 
In a non-adversarial system, the criminal trial is not conceived as a conflict or dispute but is instead 
conceived as something like an inquiry. In such a system, the judge sometimes has a more active role in 
the collection of evidence and can also interview the witnesses. 
These differences between non-adversarial system and adversarial systems may influence the shaping of 
the relationships between CSIRTs and LE and the judiciary. Furthermore, the value of e-evidence can also 
change between the systems. 
3.1.2 Criminal proceedings 
Since this report deals with the cooperation between CSIRTs and LE and their interaction with the judiciary, 
the focus is on criminal proceedings. 
As defined above, by criminal proceedings we refer to proceedings aiming to ascertain whether a crime 
has been committed and if so, by whom. 
Principles and rules governing criminal proceedings are different from those governing civil, administrative, 
disciplinary or other proceedings. 
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The criminal procedure in each country is governed by the relevant legal provisions, in most cases by the 
criminal procedure code or similar. While criminal procedure differs dramatically by jurisdiction, in most 
cases we can identify common principles and features. 
To ascertain whether a crime has been committed and if so, by whom, it is necessary to carry out a 
criminal investigation. This is followed, once there are the conditions for it (e.g. sufficient elements to 
believe that the suspect committed the crime), by a criminal charge and a formal criminal trial, which can 
be either non-adversarial or adversarial in form (based on the legal system, as discussed above). At the 
trial, the judge (or the jury) finds the defendant either guilty or not guilty based on the evidence presented 
by the prosecutor and the defendant. In a criminal trial the prosecution bears the burden of proof, which 
means that the prosecutor must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime. 
While most criminal cases are decided before national (or regional, or local) courts, under certain 
conditions it is possible that the process is held by a supranational court, such as one of the following. 
 The European Court of Human Rights (European Court of Human Rights, n.d.), which rules on 
individual or state applications alleging violations of the rights set out in the European Convention on 
Human Rights. It has its seat in Strasbourg, France. For an overview of case-law of the European Court 
of Human Rights in the area of human rights and criminal procedures see (McBride, 2018). 
 The Court of Justice of the European Union (Court of Justice of the European Union, n.d.), which 
ensures compliance with EU law and rules on the interpretation and application of the treaties 
establishing the European Union. It has its seat in Luxembourg. 
 The International Court of Justice (International Court of Justice, n.d.), which is a body of the United 
Nations based in The Hague, The Netherlands. 
 
The outcome of most criminal law cases depends upon the admissibility and strength of evidence 
presented by the prosecution or the defence. The evidence can take many different forms including 
physical evidence, testimonies, documents or e-evidence. While the admissibility of evidence is discussed 
in the following section, on the strength of the evidence we can say that the rules and practices for 
determining it differ from one jurisdiction to another, but in general, the standard of proof is high in 
criminal proceedings and therefore high-quality evidence is expected. Therefore, it is desirable (particularly 
in the case of electronic evidence) to ensure close cooperation between public prosecutors and experts to 
ensure that evidence is collected and handled with professional care. 
As mentioned in Section 1.5 — Definitions of key concepts, we can, in general, identify two main 
categories of cybercrime. 
 Cybercrimes in the strict sense, are crimes where the computer is the object and they are normally 
also committed by means of information technology (IT) tools. This is the case of illegal access to 
information system. 
 Cybercrimes in a broad sense, which are crimes that are committed by using an IT tool but could also 
be committed without the use of IT tools, like in cases when data is instrumentalised, e.g. homicide of 
a patient by manipulating data related to that patient’s health (i.e. the medical treatment 
administered according to the manipulated patient details results in the patient’s death). 
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Except for cases dealt by a supranational court, normally (cyber) crime cases are decided before national 
(or regional, or local) courts. 
3.1.3 Admissibility of electronic evidence in criminal courts 
As highlighted in Council of the European Union Final report on the seventh round of mutual evaluations on 
‘The practical implementation and operation of the European polices on prevention and combating 
cybercrime’, the ‘nature of e-evidence may create issues regarding admissibility that do not arise with 
other types of evidence. For this reason, in some Member States there are specific requirements regarding 
the collection of e-evidence to be admissible in courts. However, the evaluation has shown that in most 
Member States, procedural law is mainly technology-neutral, which means that general rules and 
principles on gathering of evidence are applied and that the procedural system does not contain any 
specific formal rules on admissibility and assessment of e-evidence’ (Council of the European Union, 2017, 
p. 11). On the topic of e-evidence in court see for instance the AEEC project (Admissibility of electronic 
evidence in court (AEEC) project, 2006), a pioneer EU project in the field (see also (Insa, Fredesvinda , 
2007), and the Evidence project (Evidence project). 
It is important that the collection of e-evidence complies with all of the relevant principles, such as data 
integrity, audit trail, specialist support, appropriate training and legality (ENISA & Anderson, 2014a, p. 5). 
E-evidence is fragile by nature and often volatile. Digital data can be easily lost or altered. If e-evidence is 
collected in an unsuitable manner, there is a risk that the content of that e-evidence does not correspond 
to the original content. There is therefore the risk that e-evidence cannot be used to help establish (or 
refute) that a crime has been committed. To avoid this risk, some best practices have been developed 
internationally. It is important that all personnel dealing with e-evidence know these best practices. 
Examples of best practices include the ISO Guidelines for identification, collection, acquisition, and 
preservation of digital evidence (International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), 2012), the NIST Guide 
to integrating forensic techniques into incident response (SP-800-86) (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), 2006) (in particular, NIST  Chapter 3), Electronic evidence — A basic guide for first 
responders (ENISA & Anderson, 2014a), Data acquisition guidelines for investigation purposes (CERT-EU, 
2012), the Guidelines on digital forensic procedures for OLAF staff (EU: European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), 
2016a)), and the United Kingdom ACPO Good practice guide for digital evidence (The Association of Chief 
Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland (ACPO), 2012). 
 Applicable legal and policy framework 
This section gives an overview of the relevant legal and policy framework that shapes the cooperation and 
interaction between CSIRTs, LE and their interaction with the judiciary. The section goes on to discuss 
recent developments that may impact or influence this cooperation and interaction such as the recent 
introduction of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union, 2016b). 
3.2.1 An Overview of the relevant legal and policy framework 
The legal and policy context play an important role in governing and shaping the cooperation between 
CSIRTs and LEs and their interaction with the judiciary in the context of fighting against cybercrime. The 
main legislative and policy components of this framework are listed below. More information on the legal 
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and policy framework is available in the 2017 ENISA report Improving cooperation between CSIRTs and law 
enforcement: Legal and organisational aspects (ENISA, 2017a). 
 The national legal and policy framework governs and shapes the cooperation between CSIRTs and LEs 
and their interaction with the judiciary. Transposition of the international and European law is an 
important component of the national criminal law and criminal procedure law. There might be 
however some specificities in legislative provisions depending on the country. 
 At the international level, the Council of Europe convention on cybercrime (Council of Europe, 2001), 
often referred to as the ‘Budapest Convention’, is the first international treaty and remains the most 
relevant international treaty on cybercrime and electronic evidence. It is the ‘only binding international 
instrument on this issue. It serves as a guideline for any country developing comprehensive national 
legislation against cybercrime and as a framework for international cooperation between state parties 
to this treaty’ (Council of Europe, n.d.) 
 At EU level several legal and policy instruments are particularly relevant when discussing the 
cooperation between CSIRTs and LEs, inter alia the following. 
 Directive on attack against information systems (European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union, 2013a). 
 NIS Directive (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2016e). 
 Cybersecurity strategy of the European Union (CSS)(European Commission and High 
Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2013). 
 Joint Communication on resilience, deterrence and defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the 
EU (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affiairs and Security 
Policy, 2017). 
 Commission recommendation on coordinated response to large scale cybersecurity incidents and 
Crises (‘Blueprint’) (European Commission, 2017a). 
 Commission communication on strengthening Europe’s cyber resilience system (European 
Commission, 2016). 
 European Investigation Order (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2014). 
 EU data protection legislation, including the GDPR (European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union, 2016b), Directive on privacy and electronic communications (European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2002), law enforcement data protection directive 
(LEA DP Directive) (Council of the European Union, 2008) (GDPR is addressed in this report in more 
detail in Section 3.2.2.1.) 
 Proposal for a Regulation on European production and preservation orders for electronic evidence 
(European Commission, 2018) (Addressed in more detail in Section 3.2.2.2.) 
 Proposal for a directive laying down harmonised rules on the appointment of legal representatives 
for the purpose of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings (European Commission, 2018a) 
(Addressed in more detail in Section 3.2.2.2.) 
 ENISA regulation (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2013b). 
 In addition, there are some EU instruments that play a role in support of the cybersecurity 
collaboration at international scale, such Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) 
(European Commission, n.d.(e)), European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) (European Union 
External Action Service, 2017) and Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) (European 
Commission, n.d.(f)). 
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Some of the most significant recent developments in the legal and policy framework shaping the CSIRT and 
LE cooperation and the interaction with the judiciary concern these two areas. 
 The GDPR (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2016b) and data protection law 
enforcement directive (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2016). 
 The proposals for a regulation and for a directive to improve cross-border access to e-evidence 
(European Commission, 2018) (European Commission, 2018a). 
3.2.2 Some recent developments 
3.2.2.1 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the data protection law enforcement directive 
The GDPR (Regulation (EU) 2016/679) (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2016b) 
strengthens the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data. It came into force on 24 May 2016 and applied from 25 May 2018. Some 
Member States have already adopted this legislation, others are working on its preparation, but this does 
not affect the binding nature of the regulation itself. 
The Data Protection Law Enforcement Directive (Directive (EU) 2016/680) ‘protects citizens’ fundamental 
right to data protection whenever personal data are used by criminal-law-enforcement authorities. It will 
ensure that the personal data of victims, witnesses, and suspects of crime are duly protected and will 
facilitate cross-border cooperation in the fight against crime and terrorism’ (European Parliament and 
Council of the European Union, 2016). It entered into force on 5 May 2016 and EU countries had to 
transpose it into their national law by 6 May 2018. Currently (status: 26 October 2018, see (EUR-lex, n.d.)), 
only 16 Member States (Belgium,  Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland, France, Croatia, Italy, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Austria, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom) reported 
adoption of transposition measures in relation to this Directive. 
The GDPR and the data protection law enforcement directive have different scopes. 
 Article 1.1 of the GDPR provides that ‘this regulation lays down rules relating to the protection of 
natural persons regarding the processing of personal data and rules relating to the free movement of 
personal data’ (7); 
 Article 1 of the data protection law enforcement directive ‘lays down the rules relating to the 
protection of natural persons regarding the processing of personal data by competent authorities for 
the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the 
execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to 
public security’. 
 
Due to the respective field of application of the GDPR and the data protection law enforcement directive, 
it can be said that in principle, both the GDPR and data protection law enforcement directive may apply to 
the CSIRTs when they deal with (including storing) personal data. However, it depends on the case. 
                                                          
(7) The first judgment on Regulation (EU) 2016/679 was issued on 29 May 2018. This is a German ruling, specifically, of the Court Order of the Regional Court 
of Bonn, 10 O 171/18, on the principle of data minimisation (ICANN v. EPAG Domainservices GmbH, 2018). Non-official translation to English (ICANN v. 
EPAG Domainservices GmbH, 2018b). 
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Under Article 6.1 a) of the GDPR, the processing of personal data, including IP addresses, is permitted for a 
specific, necessary and proportionate purpose (purpose of legitimate interest pursued by the CSIRTs, as 
specified on Article 6.1 f) if the data subject (the person concerned, the person whose personal data are 
processed) gives consent. In the event of an IT incident, there is no consent from the data subject (e.g. IP 
address holder) who caused the incident. However, according to the GDPR (see Article 13.3) and to Recital 
49 it can be considered that the personal information, under certain circumstances, can be processed by 
the CSIRT even without consent. Recital 49 indeed provides that ‘The processing of personal data to the 
extent strictly necessary and proportionate for the purposes of ensuring network and information security, 
i.e. the ability of a network or an information system to resist, at a given level of confidence, accidental 
events or unlawful or malicious actions that compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity and 
confidentiality of stored or transmitted personal data, and the security of the related services offered by, 
or accessible via, those networks and systems, by public authorities, by computer emergency response 
teams (CERTs), CSIRTs, by providers of electronic communications networks and services and by providers 
of security technologies and services, constitutes a legitimate interest of the data controller concerned. 
This could, for example, include preventing unauthorised access to electronic communications networks 
and malicious code distribution and stopping “denial of service” [DoS] attacks and damage to computer 
and electronic communication systems.’ 
If a CSIRT processes personal information, including IP address, on the basis of a specific mandate or 
delegation from competent authorities (e.g. by a police officer or by the prosecutor) for the purposes of 
the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences, the GDPR does not apply, the 
data protection law enforcement directive will apply to CSIRT instead. 
As explained in Recital 11 of the data protection law enforcement directive ‘competent authorities [for the 
purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of 
criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security, 
respecting the specific nature of those activities] may include not only public authorities such as the 
judicial authorities, the police or other law-enforcement authorities but also any other body or entity 
entrusted by Member State law to exercise public authority and public powers for the purposes of this 
directive’ (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2016). Therefore, if the CSIRT is bound 
by contract/legal act to collect and process personal data solely for the purposes mentioned in the 
directive, GDPR does not apply. The application of the GDPR on the other hand remains unaffected for the 
processing of personal data by the CSIRTs outside the scope of this directive. 
The data protection law enforcement directive applies to LEA if the directive has been implemented in the 
Member State (a Directive, unlike a Regulation, is not directly applicable). This directive does not require 
the consent of the data subject, depending on the particular purposes for which the data are processed. 
According to Article 2 par. 2 (d), the GDPR does not apply to the processing of personal data ‘by competent 
authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences 
or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to 
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public security’. Although the GDPR does not apply in these cases, the data protection law enforcement 
directive applies instead8. 
Article 45 par. 2 of the data protection law enforcement directive stipulates the conditions of control by 
the supervisory authority and it states that ‘Each Member State shall provide for each supervisory 
authority not to be competent for the supervision of processing operations of courts when acting in their 
judicial capacity’. 
3.2.2.2 Proposals for a regulation and a directive to improve cross-border access to electronic 
evidence 
As stated in the European Communication of April 2018 in the Fourteenth progress report towards an 
effective and genuine security Union, ‘Electronic evidence has become relevant in a large majority of 
criminal investigations and increasingly often, judicial authorities need to make a request in another 
jurisdiction to obtain necessary evidence from service providers. Making it easier and quicker to obtain this 
evidence across borders is therefore of crucial importance for investigating and prosecuting crime, 
including terrorism or cybercrime’ (European Commission, 2018b, p. 1). 
Currently the cross-border requests for e-evidence are processed through the mutual legal assistance 
(MLA) instruments, through the European Investigation Order or based on voluntary cooperation. 
However, the current framework does ‘Not fit for today’s volume of requests’ and there is a ‘Lack of 
connection with the receiving state’ (European Commission, 2018c). 
Therefore, the European Commission proposed a new legislative package with measures to improve cross-
border gathering of electronic evidence, in particular the following. 
 The proposal for a regulation on European production and preservation orders for e-evidence in 
criminal matters (European Commission, 2018). 
 The proposal for a directive laying down harmonised rules on the appointment of legal 
representatives for the purpose of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings (European Commission, 
2018a). 
 
These proposals should enable LE to order any service provider offering services in the EU to produce or 
preserve electronic evidence, regardless of the location of data or the service provider. European 
production and preservation orders should be based on mutual recognition (9), which means that it should 
be directly binding and enforceable to both the service provider and relevant enforcing authority. These 
orders should therefore allow for an effective and fast response of the LE to reported incidents and 
                                                          
8 See art. 1 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on 
the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. 
(9) Mutual recognition in criminal proceedings means that a specific judicial decision from one Member State should be directly enforceable in any other 
Member State without further formalities or validation. This mechanism should be, in comparison with traditional mutual legal assistance, far more 
effective and efficient. 
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cybercrimes and effective collection of volatile e-evidence. CSIRTs might help the LE with the correct 
targeting of the orders and may also benefit from the data collected by the LE using the orders. On the 
other hand, (private) CSIRTs might also be in the position of the service providers and therefore be 
required to comply with the order. 
 CSIRTs, LE and the judiciary: roles, structures and strengths 
This section provides an overview of roles, structures and strengths of the three communities (CSIRTs, LE 
and judiciary). 
3.3.1 The role of CSIRTs, LE and the judiciary 
This section provides an explanation of the roles of CSIRTs, LEs and the judiciary (prosecutor and judges). 
3.3.1.1 The role of the CSIRTs 
The main role of the CSIRT is to protect their constituency by preventing and containing IT incidents, 
primarily from a technical point of view. 
Annex I of the NIS Directive (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2016e), in addition 
to the requirements, lists the tasks of the CSIRTs, which includes at least: ‘(i) monitoring incidents at a 
national level; (ii) providing early warning, alerts, announcements and dissemination of information to 
relevant stakeholders about risks and incidents; (iii) responding to incidents; (iv) providing dynamic risk 
and incident analysis and situational awareness; (v) participating in the CSIRTs network.’ 
CSIRTs deal with incident management (IM), including incident handling. The figure below provides an 
overview of IM and incident handling stages. 
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Figure 3 — Incident management and incident handling stages (Source: (ENISA, 2010, p. 10) 
 
It must be noted that ‘CSIRTs do not have the powers of [law enforcement] LE vis-à-vis private subjects, 
but as regards attacks of a criminal nature (not all the cyber incidents are criminal acts), have an important 
role in supporting the investigations, as they can help to provide information and to secure e-evidence’ 
(Council of the European Union, 2017, p. 67). CSIRTs play an important role and ‘have to work closely with 
law enforcement [LE] and other authorities’ (ENISA, 2015c, p. 9). Additionally, CSIRT have an ongoing need 
to collaborate and communicate within their constituency and across other communities they interact 
with such as LE and the judiciary (ENISA, 2018, p. 16).   
During the incident management  and handling process, CSIRTs acquire, store and process data and they 
need to be aware that the data they process and retain can be crucial for the investigation and the 
prosecution of a crime in a criminal trial, it is important that their role, in responding to cybercrime too, is 
recognised. 
As mentioned in Recital 62 of the NIS directive (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 
2016e) indeed ‘Incidents may be the result of criminal activities the prevention, investigation and 
prosecution of which is supported by coordination and cooperation between operators of essential 
services [see Annex II of the NIS directive], digital service providers, competent authorities and law-
enforcement authorities [LEAs]. Where it is suspected that an incident is related to serious criminal 
activities under Union or national law, Member States should encourage operators of essential services 
and digital service providers to report incidents of a suspected serious criminal nature to the relevant law-
enforcement authorities. Where appropriate, it is desirable that coordination between competent 
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authorities and law-enforcement authorities of different Member States be facilitated by the European 
cybercrime centre (EC3) and ENISA’. 
3.3.1.2 The role of the LE 
The role of the LE in carrying out investigations is aimed at collecting information and evidence on whether 
a crime has been committed (or is going to be committed) and by whom. LE needs to collect evidence in 
compliance with the law and according to the powers conferred on them. In some occasions, LE has the 
possibility to collect the evidence directly, but in many cases the evidence is provided by others involved. It 
is of paramount importance to remark that if the evidence collected has been tampered with or partially 
deleted by the first responders, the future value of that evidence to support a criminal case during the 
indictment10 will be significantly or even totally affected. 
3.3.1.3 The role of the judiciary 
The role of the judiciary is variable depending on the specificities of the legal system considered; however, 
it is possible to identify three main functions of the judiciary. 
 The judiciary (namely prosecutors) supervises investigations (normally conducted by the LE). 
 The judiciary acts as body for the protection of fundamental rights. 
 The judiciary (namely judges) decides whether a crime has been committed and by whom. 
Some further details are provided below on the role of the prosecutors and judges. It must be noted that 
differences exist between legal systems and the particularities of each legal system cannot be covered in 
this report. 
3.3.1.4 The role of the prosecutors 
‘The public prosecutors’ office or prosecution service, which is regarded as part of the judiciary in most 
Member States [and for this report], plays an essential role in criminal proceedings. The responsibilities 
and status of public prosecutors vary considerably among Member States’ (European Commission (run by), 
n.d.(b)). 
The prosecutor normally coordinates and supervises criminal investigations and formulates the charge 
(when there are sufficient elements for it). 
3.3.1.5 The role of the judges 
The judge plays a central role in the criminal proceedings. Judges issue orders to perform procedural 
measures and to collect evidence, decide on the admissibility and relevance of the evidence, determine 
the facts, interpret the law and decide the case by sentencing the criminal defendants or by dismissing the 
case. Most important of all, judges are impartial decision-makers in the pursuit of justice. 
The judge is in charge to guarantee that the whole investigation and trial is in compliance with civil 
liberties and the rights of persons charged with a criminal offence. Article 6 par. 2 of European Convention 
                                                          
10 An indictment is a formal charge of a serious crime.  
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on Human Rights (Council of Europe, 1950) affirms the right to a fair trial, including that ‘Everyone charged 
with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law’. Also, the civil 
liberties and the rights of the other parties participating in a trial must be complied with (for example, 
witnesses). 
3.3.2 The structure of CSIRTs, LE and the judiciary 
This section provides an outline of the structures of CSIRTs, LE and judiciary. 
3.3.2.1 The structure of the CSIRTs 
A CSIRT is a team of IT security experts whose main business is to respond to computer security incidents, 
providing the necessary tools and services to handle them and support their constituents to mitigate the 
incidents. Also, most CSIRTs provide preventative and educational services for their constituency, issuing 
warnings on vulnerabilities, and also providing awareness to users about threats and scams taking 
advantage of these flaws. 
Based on their duties and area of responsibility (constituency), there could be national, governmental, 
sectoral and private CSIRTs. The NIS Directive (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 
2016e) does not make any reference to this categorisation of CSIRTs, and only states that Member States 
are to designate one or more CSIRTs to cover certain industry sectors. Usually national and governmental 
CSIRTs are designated by the Member States as CSIRTs under the NIS Directive. 
National and governmental CSIRTs play a key role in coordinating Incident Management with the relevant 
stakeholders at national level. In addition, they bear responsibility for cooperation with the national and 
governmental teams in other countries, and also as part of the CSIRTs network established by the NIS 
directive. 
3.3.2.2 The structure of the LE 
The LE structure has been designed to comply with both their stated missions and their legal framework of 
intervention. Although the structure differs among Member States, generally LE is hierarchically organised 
to identify each level’s responsibility and accountability. Normally each level is dedicated to a certain level 
of decision-making and should be accountable for any action taken. LE usually fulfils the following 
missions: general policing, prevention, investigating, public order and security purposes. 
Depending on the countries’ institutional landscape, the history and the legal systems, LE have different 
structures and may be organised in a more centralised way. At national level, again depending on the 
Member State, LE might be organised as a two-layer system: central entities that host the most specialised 
teams (organised crime, terrorism, intelligence, support units) and regional services which provide a 
service closer to the population. Central units normally deal with the nationwide and transnational crime, 
while regional units tend to lead investigations in their jurisdiction only. 
At international level, international entities provide coordination support among LE. Europol is the LE 
coordinating the European Member State police forces. It provides them with intelligence, analysis 
capacities (analysts and tools) as well as coordination support for joint operations. Europol is competent to 
support and strengthen action taken by MS authorities in preventing and combating organised crime, 
terrorism and other forms of serious crime affecting two or more Member States only. Each MS has 
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competent authorities which are the single point of contact for any operational and strategic 
communication between them. When an MS LE needs cooperation from another MS LEA, it needs to have 
a clear and identified point of contact to deal with, without necessarily having to be informed on the 
operational model of each police force. 
The Europol Liaison Bureaux (ELB) (11) and the joint cybercrime action taskforce (J-CAT) (12) serve as liaison 
officers focused on strengthening operational cooperation in fighting cybercrime. ELB support the law-
enforcement activities of the Member States against cybercrime by facilitating the exchange of 
information between Europol and its liaison officers; ELB are also a Point of Contact (PoC) as are Europol 
National Units (ENUs) to provide information and advice in the analysis of information concerning their 
seconding state.  (Hillebrand, 2012). J-CAT is a country-led innovative framework that includes both EU and 
non-EU countries that operates from Europol’s headquarters and it is supported by Europol’s European 
cybercrime centre (EC3). The objective of J-CAT is to drive intelligence-led, coordinated action against key 
cybercrime threats and targets by facilitating the joint identification, prioritisation, preparation and 
initiation of cross-border investigations and operations by its partners. 
Interpol is the global police organisation. With 190 members, it is the second largest international 
organisation after the United Nations. The organisation works with a network of Interpol national central 
bureaus (NCBs) which are also single PoCs in each country (Interpol, n.d.a), like the Europol ENUs. Both the 
NCBs and ENUs are LE-only entities — the information sharing is not authorised to non-LE third parties. 
The Interpol spectrum covers all EU Member States as well as countries outside the EU. While Europol and 
Interpol are two separate organisations they cooperate on a day-to-day basis (13). 
3.3.2.3 The structure of the judiciary 
‘While the judicial systems of the Member States differ significantly in detail, there is a set of common 
principles which apply to all of them, as well as to the EU as such. One of these common principles is that 
the courts must be impartial and independent of the government and the legislating institution (i.e. the 
institution(s) passing the law). This principle of independence of the judiciary is one of the values on which 
the EU is founded: the rule of law and respect for freedom, equality and fundamental rights. It is expressly 
mentioned in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, and in Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (European Commission (run by), n.d.d). 
As for the structure of the CSIRTs and the LE, the actual structure of the prosecution office and of the 
courts vary from country to country. However, there are certain similarities as described below. 
3.3.2.4 The structure of the prosecution service 
Normally the prosecution service is organised in a hierarchical way: each prosecutor reports to the 
respective superior prosecutor and there is a prosecutor-general who heads the entire prosecutor’s office. 
                                                          
(11) https://www.europol.europa.eu/partners-agreements/member-states 
(12) https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/services-support/joint-cybercrime-action-taskforce 
(13) In the case of cross-border crime that involves countries outside Europe, or countries with which Europol does not have operational agreements. 
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Depending on the country, the prosecution office might have a more centralised structure or a more 
decentralised one. 
Generally, the structure of the prosecution service mirrors that of the court system or it is even part of it 
(e.g. in countries where prosecutors and judges are part of the same structure while performing different 
roles). 
3.3.2.5 The structure of the courts 
The national court systems are normally divided into branches (e.g. ordinary civil and criminal, 
administrative, military, etc.). The ordinary criminal court systems are generally organised into first-, 
second- (e.g. courts of appeal) and third-instance courts (e.g. supreme courts), and their 
centralised/decentralised structure depends on the governmental or constitutional structure of the 
country. 
Normally the ministry of justice is responsible for matters related to court organisation, including budget. 
In some countries a supreme council of the judiciary is established as a central body responsible for 
guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary. 
Eurojust has been set up with the aim of supporting the MS competent national authorities (including 
prosecutors and judges) when they deal with serious cross-border and organised crime. Eurojust is 
‘composed of national prosecutors, magistrates, or police officers of equivalent competence, detached 
from each Member State according to their own legal systems’ (Eurojust, n.d.).  The European Council, in 
its Conclusion 46, agreed that a unit (Eurojust) should be set up, composed of national prosecutors, 
magistrates, or police officers of equivalent competence, detached from each Member State according to 
their own legal systems (Eurojust, 2018). 
3.3.2.6 The Role of CSIRTs, LE and the judiciary along with the workflow of responding to cybercrime 
According to the data collected, the role of each community (CSIRTs, LE and judiciary) along the workflow 
of responding to cybercrime can be described as follows. 
 Discovery of the crime: LE can receive a crime report (e.g. from the victim) or discover a suspicious 
activity by itself. The CSIRT can discover a suspicious activity during incident handling and, depending 
on the legal system may have/has an obligation to inform LE of the activity. In some Member States, 
at least under certain circumstances, CSIRT (the focus of this report is national and/or governmental 
CSIRTs) in certain circumstances national or governmental CSIRTS must inform the prosecutor of any 
activity that might be considered criminal. 
 Criminal investigation: normally LE conducts the criminal investigation while the prosecutor defines 
the strategy of the case, sets the evidence threshold and supervises it. The judiciary ensures that the 
investigation is conducted in compliance with civil liberties and guarantees (14) and defines the limits 
of protection of the rights of the persons investigated.. Depending on the severity of the crime and 
the complexity of the case, the investigation means used (undercover police investigation, use of 
                                                          
(14) On common minimum rules concerning certain aspects of the presumption of innocence in criminal proceedings and the right to be present at the trial 
in criminal proceedings see (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2016a). For an overview of case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights in the area of human rights and criminal procedures see (McBride, 2018). 
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wiretaping technology, etc.) vary. CSIRT may play a role in the investigation by providing technical 
expertise and supporting the evidence collection (and preservation) by sharing information they have, 
or they have access to. As stated in the 2017 ENISA reports on CSIRT and LE cooperation (ENISA, 
2017a) (ENISA, 2017) and confirmed during the interviews conducted for this report, CSIRTs and LE 
indeed often exchange information (both formally and informally) related to cybercrime cases, for 
instance to avoid interference in their actions. CSIRTs can support the investigations by providing LE 
with useful information for the investigations. When a more formal involvement of CSIRTs is required 
during the criminal investigations, the prosecutor usually needs to be consulted and give consent for 
the involvement of CSIRT in digital evidence acquiring, handling and analysis. This is because CSIRTs 
are not operating under the strict LE rules. 
 Prosecution either press charges or suspend/archive the case: a criminal proceeding normally starts 
after the formal criminal charge (i.e. the formal accusation), usually made either by the prosecutor or 
by the police; it ends with the conviction or acquittal of the defendant. If the evidence collected 
support a charge then the competent authority (normally the prosecutor) formulates the charge and 
the suspect (normally from this point onwards called ‘the defendant’) is brought to court. If the 
amount and quality of the evidence collected during the criminal investigation is not sufficient to 
proceed or if the evidence collected shows that the facts do not have the elements to constitute a 
crime, in several states the prosecutor can discard the case. This however does not mean that the 
CSIRT must discard the eradication and the recovery phase (ENISA, 2016d, p. 10); an important phase 
of the incident response and that still needs to be performed from the incident handling process 
(SANS, 2011, p. 8). 
 Trial: although (according to the data collected) this happens in general very rarely, a member of the 
CSIRT may be called to play a role in the process before a criminal court aiming to decide whether a 
person (after the formal charge, ‘the defendant’) has committed a crime. At least in some Member 
States a CSIRT expert can be called to testify as an (expert) witness in computer crime cases. The 
CSIRT experts testify based on the general rules of testimony normally set out in the criminal 
procedural codes. However, according to the data collected via interviews and the online survey, the 
cases where CSIRT experts are called as witnesses in criminal proceeding are not frequent at all. Some 
interviewees stated that in some cases, detailed reports from CSIRTs are also used in criminal 
proceedings to support the decision on the conviction or the acquittal of the defendant. Furthermore, 
CSIRTs can also provide other forms of evidence (for instance, a cloned image of a hard disk) to be 
used in criminal proceedings. CSIRTs have a long history of cooperation across the EU and they 
coordinate by means of a CSIRT secretariat function provided for in the network and information 
security directive (NISD). 
 
All of the examples given above of course vary depending on the legal systems and on the specificities of 
the crime, including its severity. 
Based on the data collected via the online survey and the literature research, it is clear that LE and/or 
prosecutors take the lead in criminal investigations. 
  
Cooperation between CSIRTs and Law Enforcement: interaction with the Judiciary 
  November 2018  
   
32 
Figure 4 — Replies to question 10 of the online survey conducted for this report 
 
3.3.3 Strengths of the three communities 
The main strengths of the CSIRT and LE communities identified by the data collected via the online survey 
(see  Figures 5 and 6) include the following. 
 For the CSIRTs: the use of agile processes, the technical skills and the technical tools used, as well as 
the well-established cooperation they have within and outside the CSIRT community (e.g. security 
companies and internet service providers (ISPs)). 
 For the LE: the ability to draft detailed reports to be used in criminal proceedings, the knowledge of 
the chain of custody and the requirements for admissibility of evidence in court as well as the 
detective skills and well-defined roles which are easy to understand by all parties. 
 
Figure 5 — Replies to question 15 of the online survey conducted for this report 
 
Q10: In your country who takes the 
lead in criminal investigations? 
Q15 - What are 
the strengths 
that 
national/gover
nmental CSIRT 
in your country 
has and you 
would wish to 
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Figure 6 — Replies to question 16 of the online survey conducted for this report 
 
No specific data were collected via the online survey on the strengths of the judiciary. However, from 
some statements made by the subject-matter experts interviewed it can be derived that prosecutors and 
judges (because of their role, experience and background) have a deep knowledge of matters related to 
admissibility of evidence and the delicate balance between the need for collection and preservation of e-
evidence to prosecute crime and the protection of the fundamental rights. 
 The interaction and the information flow across CSIRTs, LE and the judiciary 
This section addresses the interaction and information flow across CSIRTs, LEs and the judiciary, in 
particular focusing on LE’s direct and indirect interactions during investigations, the duties of CSIRTs 
followed by an in-depth discussion on the types of information that is exchanged. 
Cooperation between CSIRTs, LE and the judiciary can be mutually beneficial. This is also illustrated by 
examples from practice. One of these examples can be the cooperation between a national/governmental 
CSIRT or another CSIRT (e.g. a university CSIRT) and the police in the case of attempted hacker attacks on a 
computer system, as illustrated in the example in the box. 
  
Q16: What are the 
strengths that law 
enforcement in your 
country has and you would 
wish to see more in the 
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Example of cooperation between CSIRTs, LEs and the judiciary 
A CSIRT detects an incident likely to be a crime (e.g. an attack against an information system) 
and informs the police/files a complaint with the police, which in turn ask for the details about 
the incident and possible evidence. 
Thanks to the close cooperation and the police instructions, the CSIRT is able to collect relevant 
traffic and localisation data in a way that allows it to be used as evidence in court. Further 
investigation reveals that the incident was of a larger scale than initially estimated and that 
further data are needed from other service providers. Therefore, using the police procedural 
tools and the expertise of the CSIRT staff, additional data are requested from the operator of 
the network, through which the communication traces of the attacker are identified, and other 
victim organisations are identified. 
The data obtained reveal that the attacker’s communication in several cases was led through 
servers in a different jurisdiction. Thanks to the involvement of the CSIRT and the CSIRT 
community, additional necessary operational data from a CSIRT in a different country are 
obtained and then made available to the police. Obtaining these data following the standard 
measures of international police and judicial cooperation in criminal cases would have taken 
much longer. At the stage of analysing, processing and applying the evidence in court, the police 
can also use advanced forensic tools and CSIRT personnel’s expertise. 
Following this positive experience of cooperation, both the police and the CSIRT are able to 
identify problematic areas of cooperation that they can then streamline. For example, within 
the CSIRT, internal processes for informing the police/filing complaints with the police and for 
collecting evidence or passing it on to LE are established. On the part of the police, means for 
securing the electronic transfer of digital evidence are implemented, as well as procedural 
measures for cooperation with security teams, including measures that allow secure two-way 
sharing of sensitive information. On the part of the court, the possibility of using a CSIRT 
employee as an expert witness, who is able to explain to the court the technical details of the 
case and the specifics of the individual pieces of evidence, is verified. 
 
3.4.1 Indirect v. direct interaction between CSIRTs and prosecutor and judge 
The default approach for an investigation is that LE undertakes the investigative aspects of an incident and 
the prosecutor supervises the investigation. The leads to follow, the targets to work on and the legal 
framework are decided by the prosecutor. While it is normally done through cooperation, where there is 
any disagreement the final say is with the prosecutor and, in some case, with the judge. In several EU 
Member States, when a crime is ongoing, or the incident has just occurred (e.g. within 24 hours), LE can 
undertake immediate actions such as searches, arrests and warrants without the prosecutor’s prior 
agreement (although a validation of the measures taken is then needed) and only for as long as a 
prosecutor has not been assigned to or not taken the lead in the investigation yet. 
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As an investigation unfolds, LE and prosecutors continually make decisions to adapt to the circumstances 
of the events. In this situation, the CSIRTs can be formally asked to cooperate by providing their technical 
expertise or data that they may have e.g. in their own systems or via their channels. 
CSIRTs normally interact with LE much more rarely do they engage directly with the prosecutor. Several 
interviewees described the normal information flow as ‘linear’, in other words CSIRT > LE > prosecutor 
(> judge). That means that normally the CSIRT informs LE and then LE informs the prosecutor. 
However, under certain circumstances (namely for emergency cases) the CSIRT has a direct channel (email, 
phone) to the prosecutor e.g. when LE is not available, the CSIRT can report a crime directly to the 
prosecutor. In addition, the prosecutor can directly request the CSIRT for instance to explain to the 
prosecutor a specific technical point which will inform the next stages of the investigation. In this situation, 
the prosecutor can directly engage with the CSIRT, but the LE might still act as a facilitator. 
Some interviewees stated that there are also formal and informal ways of communication and that 
sometimes official requests for information (e.g. from CSIRT to LE or from LE to CSIRTs) are preceded by 
some informal discussion between CSIRT and LE personnel working on the incident/case. 
CSIRTs (like any witness) can be requested to provide testimony during a trial. Either the prosecutor or the 
defence can summon CSIRT personnel who provided evidence. In this case, the CSIRT personnel are 
normally in the same situation as the private expert when giving testimony. As expert witnesses, CSIRTs 
personnel have to outline their skills and knowledge and explain to the court how the evidence was 
handled. The defence might aim to challenge not the evidence as such but how that evidence was 
collected and handled (e.g. searched for, collected and preserved). It must be noted that while LE 
personnel are generally prepared to testify in Court, CSIRT personnel may be reluctant or ill-prepared to 
serve as expert witnesses in Court as they might be less familiar with trial sessions. 
To summarise, CSIRTs normally interact with the judiciary via LE and do not have direct interaction with 
prosecutors: they have even less frequent direct interaction with judges. There are however cases where 
CSIRT and prosecutors and judges have direct contact, for instance when the CSIRT is asked to provide 
technical input directly to the prosecutor on a case or where the CSIRT is asked to testify in court. 
Nonetheless, the contact is normally facilitated by the LE, especially in the case of interaction between the 
CSIRT and the prosecutor. 
According to the data collected both via the interviews and the online survey, where the CSIRTs have a 
duty to report cybercrime (whether CSIRTs have this duty is discussed below in the report), normally the 
CSIRT report to LE although there are cases (depending on the legal systems) where they report it directly 
to the prosecutor. The results from the online survey on this matter are represented in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7 — Replies to question 9A of the online survey conducted for this report 
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3.4.2 CSIRTs and their duty (or not) to inform law enforcement or prosecutor and/or to report a 
crime and the coordination of actions 
From data collected via interviews it emerged that whether a national/governmental CSIRT has a duty to 
inform or report to the LE or to the prosecutor varies considerably from country to country. However, even 
considering this differentiating factor, it seems that there is a lack of common understanding on when CSIRTs 
have a duty to report an alleged criminal act: the data collected appears indeed rather heterogeneous. It 
may also be the case that CSIRTs require continuous support and legal guidance to be better able to 
determine when an incident can be considered a crime.  
Figure 8 — Replies to question 9 of the online survey conducted for this report 
 
 
Q9A: To whom 
does the 
national/gover
nmental CSIRT 
in your country 
Q9: Have the national/governmental 
CSIRTs in your country a duty to report 
cybercrime to the law enforcement? 
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Concerning the duty of the CSIRTs to inform the victims, as shown in Figure 9, according to most 
respondents to the online survey, CSIRTs have this duty only under certain circumstances (not much more 
additional data were gathered on such circumstances). 
Figure 9 — Replies to question 8 of the online survey conducted for this report 
 
However, whether or not CSIRTs have a duty to inform LE (or the prosecutor) and/or the victim, one of the 
most important aspects to consider is the coordination process between CSIRTs, LE and the prosecutor. 
As mentioned, CSIRTs are more focused on preventing and reacting to cyber incidents, but some CSIRT 
actions may affect criminal investigations (in most countries conducted by the police and 
coordinated/supervised by the prosecution service). An example is the case when a CSIRT might notify a 
web domain owner or the host about a command and control server and request shut down. But at the 
same time that command and control server might be under investigation by an LE. That is why the 
coordination and escalation process between different entities must be in place and clear to all parties 
(CSIRTs, LE and the judiciary). 
Proper coordination in the cyber field does require proper mechanisms and tools, including the usage of a 
dedicated platform where different types of data can be properly marked (e.g. a specific domain is 
sinkholed (15) and cannot be the subject of a takedown). However, it must be noted that CSIRTs and LE are 
already using their own platforms for information storing, processing and exchange (e.g. the ‘MeliCERTes 
facility [in the CSIRT community that] aims to facilitate swift and effective operational cooperation for the 
CSIRT network’ (European Commission, 2017b). A new platform might lead to the duplication of efforts. 
                                                          
(15) ‘DNS sinkholing is a mechanism aimed at protecting users by intercepting DNS request attempting to connect to known malicious or unwanted 
domains and returning a false, or rather controlled IP address. The controlled IP address points to a sinkhole server defined by the DNS sinkhole 
administrator.’ (https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/csirts-in-europe/glossary/dns-sinkhole). 
 
Q8: In your 
country, 
have the 
national/gov
ernmental 
CSIRTs a 
duty to 
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3.4.3 The kind of information exchanged and the related information flow 
According to the results from the online survey shown in Figure 10 as well as those from the subject-
matter expert interviews, the CSIRT-provided data most often used for criminal investigations are 
indicators of compromise (IOCs), IP addresses, information on modus operandi and timeline. 
Figure 10 — Replies to question 5 of the online survey conducted for this report 
 
Also, according to several subject-matter experts interviewed, the CSIRTs normally share with the police 
and (whether directly or via the police) with the prosecutor any type of information that is related to the 
incident and that might be relevant for the investigation. This information includes IPs addresses, web 
domains, email details (addresses, headers, content) and IOCs. 
LE shares mainly IP addresses with CSIRTs, while sharing all information needed to decide on criminal 
prosecution with the prosecutors and judges. The judges share with judges all (digital) evidence useful to 
prosecute the suspect. Digital evidence sharing between judges belonging to different Member States can 
be either direct or indirect. This depends on what is provided for in bilateral or multilateral agreements 
between the states, if they exist, and on the cooperation in criminal matters that can be used in the 
specific case. 
Almost any kind of data might be relevant and thus can be exchanged between CSIRTs and LEAs. They are 
still using the comma separated value (csv) format which can be converted into any human- or machine-
processable format of events. 
Similar replies were given in the online survey to the question on what kind of CSIRT-provided data are 
most often used as evidence in criminal proceedings in court. However, the number of ‘no answer 
Q5: In your experience what kind of 
data provided by CSIRT is most often 
used for criminal investigations? 
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provided’ received in response to this question was higher; this might be since the respondents (especially 
from the CSIRT community) have less visibility on the actual use of the information they provide in court. 
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Figure 11 — Replies to question 6 of the online survey conducted for this report 
 
3.4.4 Frequency of the information exchange and of the usage of information provided by CSIRTs in 
criminal investigations and as evidence in criminal proceedings 
Several interviewees noted that the information sharing between CSIRTs and LE may be very frequent (on 
a daily basis or more than once a day), but it depends on the incident and on the severity of the incident. 
Some other interviewees stated that the information sharing is much less frequent, e.g. once per month. 
In principle information sharing takes place immediately where there is an emergency and around once a 
week for minor incidents (as some interviewees highlighted, it not possible to send information 
immediately for minor incidents and therefore a list of minor incidents is sent to LE or to the prosecution 
office (depending on the country) e.g. once per week). 
CSIRTs share information with LE also for intelligence purposes and there are regular bulletins (e.g. once 
per month) sent. 
Some interviewees noted that when there is an emergency (and LE is not available), the 
national/governmental CSIRT has a direct channel to the prosecutor (e.g. phone). This provision, of course, 
does not undermine the 24/7 PoC service available in each MS. 
On the usage of information provided by CSIRTs, it must be noted that according to the answers received 
via the online survey, most respondents replied that it is used occasionally for criminal investigation while 
rarely as evidence in criminal proceeding. See Figure 12.  
Q6: In your experience what 
kind of data provided by CSIRT 
is most often used as evidence 
in criminal proceedings in 
court? 
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Figure 12 — Replies to question 1 of the online survey conducted for this report 
 
Figure 13 — Replies to question 2 of the online survey conducted for this report 
 
Further, Figures 14 and 15 show that, according to the replies received from the online survey, CSIRTs are 
hardly ever called either to write detailed expert reports to use in criminal proceedings or to be witnesses 
in criminal courts. 
 
Q1 - How often in your country is 
information provided by CSIRTs - in 
particular national/governmental CSIRTs - 
used for criminal investigations? 
Q2 - How often in 
your country is 
information 
provided by 
CSIRTs - in 
particular 
national/governm
ental CSIRTs - 
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Figure 14 — Replies to question 3 of the online survey conducted for this report 
 
Figure 15 — Replies to question 4 of the online survey conducted for this report 
 
3.4.5 A graphical representation of the information flow 
Although the information flow across CSIRTs, LE and judiciary varies from legal system to legal system it 
also depends on the specific case being dealt with (e.g. the severity of the case and whether it’s considered 
an emergency might have an impact on the information flow), a graphical representation of this flow of 
information is presented in Figure 16 based on an abstraction and generalisation of the data collected for 
this report (especially the responses from the subject-matter expert interviews and the online survey). The 
broken lines in it represent information provided, as opposed to the arrows which represent actions taken. 
This graphical representation (with all the usual limitations due to abstraction and generalisation) aims to 
describe what the information flow might look like and shows the complexity of such information flow. 
Q3 - In your country, how 
often are 
national/governmental 
CSIRTs called to write 
detailed expert reports to 
Q4 - In your country, how often 
national/governmental CSIRT is 
called as witness in criminal 
proceedings in court? 
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Figure 16 — Graphical representation of the flow of information across CSIRTs, LE and the judiciary 
 
Responses to Question 11 on the online survey (see Figure 18), ‘agree’ or ‘partially agree’ on the 
interaction and the information flow across CSIRTs, LE and the judiciary working well. This gives a clear 
indication that when information is exchanged then the process does work but perhaps there is room for 
improvement. 
Figure 17 — Replies to question 11 of the online survey conducted for this report 
 
Some interviewees noted that the information flow is largely one-way (from CSIRTs to LEs/prosecutor) and 
this is mainly due to the prosecution and LE not being allowed to share information/evidence collected 
within the criminal proceedings (see Section 4.1.2 on the secrecy of criminal investigations in the report). 
The information flow from LE/prosecutor to CSIRTs takes place only to prevent further damage or in 
emergency situations. Other respondents highlighted that police can only officially share with the CSIRT a 
Q11 - Does the interaction and the 
information flow across CSIRTs, 
law enforcement and judiciary 
(prosecutors and judges) work 
well? 
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specific portion of the information as aprecautionary measure, i.e. all information not classified as 
‘secrecy’; clearly the public prosecutor that directs the investigation can order the sharing of additional 
pieces of information. 
Other interviewees noted that the distribution of authority and formalities sometimes make the 
cooperation/interaction less smooth, but that this might also be so due to the need to comply with certain 
legal requirements. 
What has also emerged from data collected is that cooperation and interaction depends on interpersonal 
relations: if the interpersonal relations are good, the cooperation/interaction works well. This finding further 
confirmed one of the findings of the 2017 ENISA reports on CSIRTs and law-enforcement cooperation (ENISA, 
2017) (ENISA, 2017a), i.e. that trust is paramount for the cooperation among the three communities. 
 The tools and the common taxonomy for CSIRTs and law enforcement 
This section provides a detailed overview of the tools and taxonomies used for data sharing. 
3.5.1 Tools 
This section gives an overview of the tools for normal communication and information sharing within the 
CSIRTs and within the LE community for cooperation between the two communities. 
As mentioned above, the CSIRTs interact with the prosecutors generally via LE; they interact rarely with 
judges (only seldom they are called as expert witnesses in court). For this reason, the tools used by the 
prosecutors and judges for their internal communication and information sharing or for communication 
with the CSIRTs are not addressed in this report. 
3.5.1.1 Overview of tools used within the CSIRTs community and within the law-enforcement 
community 
Secure email is a common tool in the cybersecurity community and is used by LE to communicate and 
share information with other police forces and with independent or private-sector experts, as well as with 
CSIRT personnel. LE tends to use the pretty good privacy (PGP) cryptography system more and more, this 
allows LE to protect the data in exchanges with other police forces (also in international exchanges) in an 
easy manner. MS competent authorities (e.g. LE) also use other secured email systems to exchange non-
structured data very quickly, e.g. the secure information exchange network application (SIENA), the 
Europol platform for experts (EPE) for non-operational exchange of information for Europol or the Interpol 
PoC for Interpol. 
For more structured data the only family of tools comprises police files: the wanted or signalled person or 
objects stored in the national and EU databases. This tool seems to fit better to certain types of data, such 
as IOCs or other pure cybercrime data. The analysis projects, (previously called focal points (16)) also are 
important tools: each piece of data is analysed stored in Europol databases to then be shared in order to 
identify common cases among several countries. 
                                                          
(16) https://www.europol.europa.eu/crime-areas-trends/europol-analysis-projects 
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The malware information-sharing platform (MISP) platform is a widely used and well-established tool 
within the CSIRT community. The MISP’s main use and its strong point is its sharing capability: a user of the 
platform can very easily share routine structured data with other entities through push and pull. MISP is 
ingreasingly becoming a standard among the CSIRT community in the EU and EFTA. A new trend in LE is to 
implement MISP (Computer Incident Response Center (CIRCL) Luxembourg, 2018). The MISP tool is also fit 
for storing IOCs and for sharing them in an automated and structured way. It is a good first place for LE to 
discover threat intelligence: the MISP instances automatically share the feeds at each update. 
Within the LE community, in addition to MISP, the use of other new tools is increasing for cybercrime-
oriented information sharing. Europol malwares analysis system (EMAS) for instance allows LE to share 
malware samples: each malware submitted is analysed. The IOC obtained are then crossmatched in 
Europol databases. The EPE is a portal full of information and tools. Among them can be found technical 
developments for IT forensic investigations, best practices or WHOIS legal considerations. It is one of the 
communication tools of Europol’s EC3 with the LE community alongside EPE that allows private parties, 
LEA and others to exchange information. It uses secured connections and closed networks. Working with 
outside partners creates new habits and new systems such as interconnecting networks that were isolated 
before. 
LE use investigation graph tools which crawl into any kind of dataset to make connections and provide a 
graphical representation of them. Some of the tools can be fed with any type of data, such as blockchain 
(17), Structured Query Language (SQL) database (DB), in-house files and so on. 
More generally, LE are entering into the threat-intelligence area with tools able to manage and crosscheck 
large datasets for further identification of perpetrators. It is usually based on the Elasticsearch 
framework (18) with a lot of in-house programing to fit LE needs: graph visualisation, indexing of seized 
hacker forums, etc. 
3.5.1.2 Overview of tools used for information sharing between the CSIRT and LE communities 
Basic standard tooling such as secure email and telephone are used for communication and information 
sharing between CSIRTs and LE. As also highlighted in 2017 ENISA report on Tools and methodologies to 
support cooperation between CSIRTs and law enforcement (ENISA, 2017, p. 28), in ‘several Member States 
there is an already established and secure (and sometimes segregated) government network that can be 
used for secure communication. These types of network could be used as a communication path for 
exchanging information’. 
Since the use of MISP is already widespread in the CSIRT community and there is an ongoing increase in 
the use of MISP by LE, it seems to be or likely to be one of the most suitable tools for the exchange of 
information between CSIRTs and LE. ‘It is important to note that a separate community (or even better a 
                                                          
(17) Blockchain is a public ledger consisting of all transactions taken place across a peer-to-peer network. It is a data structure consisting of 
linked blocks of data, e.g. confirmed financial transactions with each block pointing/referring to the previous one forming a chain in linear and 
chronological order. This decentralised technology enables the participants of a peer-to-peer network to make transactions without the need of a 
trusted central authority and at the same time relying on cryptography to ensure the integrity of transactions. 
(https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/csirts-in-europe/glossary/blockchain). 
(18) https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/index.html 
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separate MISP instance) can be used for information exchange between CSIRT and LEA. This way, there is 
no risk for potentially disclosing sensitive information with parties that should not [have it]’ (ENISA, 2017, 
p. 30). 
Whenever needed, also face-to-face meetings, even in particularly secure locations if required, take place 
between CSIRTs and law enforcement. 
3.5.2 Common taxonomy for CSIRTs and law enforcement 
Although CSIRTs and LE might have their own taxonomy to deal with incidents/cybercrime, a common 
taxonomy for CSIRTs and LE enforcement has been developed to facilitate their cooperation. The ‘common 
taxonomy for LE and CSIRTs, which was set up to simplify CSIRT and LEA cooperation. This taxonomy 
resulted from collaboration initiatives such as the annual ENISA/EC3 workshop which involved CSIRTs, 
LEAs, ENISA, and EC3’ (ENISA, 2018). The common taxonomy for CSIRTs and LE has as an objective ‘to 
support the CSIRTs a\nd the public prosecutors in their dealing with LEAs in cases of criminal 
investigations, by providing a common taxonomy for the classification of incidents, named common 
taxonomy for law enforcement and the national network of CSIRTs’ (Europol: European Cybercrime Centre 
and ENISA, 2017). This common taxonomy has been already implemented and imported in MISP (GitHub, 
n.d. a). 
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 Challenges in cooperation and interaction 
This chapter outlines the legal, cultural, technical and organisational challenges faced in the cooperation 
between CSIRTs and LEs and their interaction with the judiciary. 
 
 The challenges faced 
According to the data collected for this report, there are challenges related to the cooperation between 
CSIRTs and LE (which is line also to the findings from 2017 ENISA reports (ENISA, 2017) (ENISA, 2017a), and 
their interaction with the judiciary. In particular, these challenges seem to be first legal, then cultural, 
technical and organisational. See Figure 18 which illustrates these findings. 
Figure 18 — Replies to question 12 of the online survey conducted for this report 
 
 Legal challenges 
This section presents some legal challenges faced in the cooperation between CSIRTs and LE and their 
interaction with the judiciary as identified from the data collected for this report. 
4.2.1 Data retention 
An important challenge is the need to find a balance between two opposing requirements. The first 
requirement is the investigative need to preserve the greatest amount of traffic data (19) for as long as 
possible. However, such data retention inevitably interferes with some fundamental rights, in particular 
                                                          
(19) Article 1, letter d) of the Convention on Cybercrime (Council of Europe, 2001) states that ‘Traffic data’ ‘means any computer data relating to a 
communication by means of a computer system, generated by a computer system that formed a part in the chain of communication, indicating the 
communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying service’. These data, e.g. the IP address, can be very important 
in criminal investigations. For this reason, the legislation of many Member States requires that ‘traffic data’ be kept for a certain time for the purpose of 
the investigation, the detection and the prosecution of crime. This storage activity of ‘traffic data’ is called ‘data retention’. 
Q12: Are there any 
challenges hindering 
the interaction and 
information flow 
across CSIRTs, law 
enforcement and 
judiciary 
(prosecutors and 
judges)? 
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the right to privacy and the right to erasure (or the right to be forgotten). Consequently, there is a second 
requirement, related to the principle that a level of government must not take any action that exceeds 
that necessary to carry out its assigned tasks (‘proportionality’): the fundamental rights can be violated for 
investigative purposes without exceeding the limits of what is strictly necessary. 
Finding a balance between these two needs is not easy. The no-longer-in-force Directive 2006/24/EC (20) 
(European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2006) provided some rules on this topic. 
However, the judgment of the grand chamber in Joined Case C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland 
Ltd v minister for communications, marine and natural resources and others and Kärntner Landesregierung 
and others (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2014) , of 8 April 2014 took the view that ‘Directive 
2006/24 does not lay down clear and precise rules governing the extent of the interference with the 
fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. It must therefore be held that Directive 
2006/24 entails a wide-ranging and particularly serious interference with those fundamental rights in the 
legal order of the EU, without such an interference being precisely circumscribed by provisions to ensure 
that it is actually limited to what is strictly necessary’ (see par. 65). Accordingly, the judgment of the grand 
chamber declared Directive 2006/24/EC invalid because of a violation of the principle of proportionality. 
For an overview of amendments to national data retention laws in 2016 after the Digital Rights Ireland 
judgment see (FRA). On case-law related to the concept of personal data, jurisprudence on IP addresses 
and data retention relevant for CSIRT and LE cooperation, see also the ENISA report Improving cooperation 
between CSIRTs and law enforcement: Legal and organisational aspects (ENISA, 2017a, pp. 30-31). 
4.2.2 Secrecy of criminal investigations and the ‘need to know’ 
Data exchange between CSIRTs and law enforcement represents a challenge in two ways: from CSIRT to LE 
and from LE to CSIRT. 
For the information flow from LE to CSIRT, if the information originated from an investigation, the secret of 
the investigation applies, and law enforcement are not in a position to share the information they have 
with the CSIRTs. However, it must be noted that the prosecutor can exceptionally authorise a police officer 
to share and ‘release’ that person of this obligation to secrecy. In such cases, information sharing is then 
allowed, usually for impelling remediation motives or if it concerns information that is not sensitive for the 
investigation. 
As emerged from the interviews, one of the most challenging aspects is the balance between the need to 
maintain the secrecy and the ‘need to know’: both CSIRTs and LE might work on the same incident/case 
and if there is no coordination they might interfere in a detrimental way in each other’s work. In addition, 
for instance, if LE cannot share some information during the investigations, then it is difficult for the CSIRT 
to understand LE needs. 
As far as it concerns the information flow from CSIRT to LE, it is important to consider how the LE can 
receive and use data from outside sources. Usually, data transferred by CSIRTs are for intelligence 
purposes. Should any of the data be used to identify and arrest a person, a stringent set of rules must be 
followed (see Section 4.1.6 — Chain of custody). Data collected to be used for judicial purposes must 
                                                          
(20) Directive concerned the retention of data generated or processed in connection with providing publicly available electronic communications services or 
of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC. 
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follow evidence rules. The problem arises in this context when CSIRT information handling and 
transmission channels might not be well fitted to this situation. 
4.2.3 Sharing of personal data, including IP addresses 
One of the current challenges is to maintain and, where possible and needed, to increase the data sharing 
between CSIRTs and LEAs while remaining in line with the personal data legal framework provisions. Based 
on applicable legislation and the common interpretation, in principle IP addresses are considered personal 
data. Not only IP addresses but any online identifier that may be connected to natural persons (e.g. 
domain names, URLs, or email addresses) is personal data. In addition, sometimes the threat/incident data 
or intelligence may contain not only metadata but also content data. 
It is therefore important to see to what extent IP addresses and other personal information related to the 
incident are allowed to be shared between CSIRTs and LEAs. On LEAs, it is clearly marked in Article 2 d) of 
the GDPR that there is no limitation, and in Recital 49, allows CSIRTs to process that information. 
The Data Protection Law Enforcement Directive (Directive (EU) 2016/680) (European Parliament and 
Council of the European Union, 2016) is an important point of reference on the subject. It clarifies that 
when the processing of personal data by competent authorities is carried out for the purposes of the 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal 
penalties, consent by the owner of these personal data is not required. However, there might be other 
cases where the sharing of personal data between CSIRTs and LE takes place and the related data process 
(including the sharing) must have a different legal ground, which could be, for instance, the protection of 
public interest or the consent of the data owner. 
4.2.3.1 An Introduction to the WHOIS registry/service 
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is ‘a not-for-profit, public-benefit 
organisation’ that operates ‘the internet’s domain name system [DNS], coordinates allocation and 
assignment of the internet’s unique identifiers, such as internet protocol [IP] addresses, accredits generic 
top-level domain (gTLD) name registrars, and helps facilitate the voices of volunteers worldwide who are 
dedicated to keeping the internet secure, stable and interoperable’ (ICANN, 2018a, p. 2). 
WHOIS (21) is ‘the system that asks the question, who is responsible for a domain name or an IP address?’ 
(ICANN, 2018b) The WHOIS data may include ‘name, address, email, phone number, and administrative 
                                                          
(21) What is the domain WHOIS? 
 Publicly available database of registration information on registrants of a domain name. 
 Maintained by ICANN and its contracted registries and registrars. 
What information? 
 Domain names details: 
 Domain name, IP address, Name server, creation/expiry date, domain status. 
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and technical contacts’. WHOIS is a query and response protocol with data stored in a decentralised way; 
in other words, ‘the WHOIS service is not a single, centrally-operated database’: the data are managed by 
independent entities known as ‘registrars’ and ‘registries’. (ICANN, 2018c). 
The registrar is ‘An organisation that verifies availability and reserves domain names on behalf of a 
registrant. Domain names ending with .aero, .biz, .com, .coop, .info, .museum, .name, .net, .org, and .pro 
can be registered through many different companies (known as ‘registrars’) that compete with one 
another. A listing of these companies appears in the accredited registrar directory’ (ICANN, 2018a). ‘Any 
entity that wants to become a registrar must earn ICANN accreditation’ (ICANN, 2018b). 
The registry is an entity that ‘keeps the master database and also generates the ‘zone file’ which allows 
computers to route Internet traffic to and from top-level domains anywhere in the world. Internet users 
do not interact directly with the registry operator; users can register names in top-level domains (TLDs). 
including.biz,.com,.info,.net,.name,.org by using an ICANN-accredited registrar’ (ICANN, 2018a, p. 23) 
 
4.2.4 Fundamental rights 
CSIRTs and LE handle various types of data. ‘All categories of data may be personal data’, e.g. content data 
but also subscriber data; however, ‘they have a different level of interference with fundamental rights’ 
(European Commission, 2018c). Based on the data dealt with, appropriate conditions and safeguards apply 
to their collection and preservation and it is necessary to find a balance between the needs for collection 
and preservation of e-evidence and the protection of the fundamental rights of the suspect; this to 
guarantee the rights of third parties (including the victim) and also the rights of the suspect during the 
criminal investigations and the right of the accused to a fair trial. 
It must be also noted that both LE and judiciary should request from CSIRTs only the information that is 
strictly necessary. This is also imposed by Article 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights or the European 
Union (European Parliament, Council and Commission, 2000), which provides that ‘Any limitation on the 
exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this charter must be provided for by law and respect the 
essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made 
only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the [European] 
Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others’. For an overview of case-law of the 
European Court of Human Rights in the area of human rights and criminal procedures see (McBride, 2018). 
                                                          
 Information on Registrar 
 Registrar’s URL, registrar’s abuse email, phone number. 
 Information on registrants (domain name holder) 
 Registrant email, postal address, fax and telephone number. 
 Administration contact and technical details 
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4.2.5 Chain of custody and evidence admissibility 
Compliance with the chain of custody plays a fundamental role in the criminal trial, since it is not only the 
type of data that has been collected that is important, but also the fact that the data are stored with 
continuity according to certain technical rules (in addition to the guidelines mentioned in Section 3.1.4 — 
Admissibility of electronic evidence in criminal courts, see Identification and handling of electronic 
evidence handbook, Document for teachers, (ENISA, 2013b); Digital forensics. Toolset, document for 
students (ENISA, 2013a); Mobile threats incident handling: Handbook, Document for teachers (ENISA, 
2014); Methodologies for the identification of critical information infrastructure assets and services. 
Guidelines for charting electronic data communication networks (ENISA, 2015d); Forensic analysis. 
Webserver analysis handbook, Document for teachers (ENISA, 2018); and Exploring cloud incidents (ENISA, 
2016c)). 
‘The chain of custody through appropriate policy frameworks can be used in order to assess the quality of 
the collected data. […] Chain of custody investigations may also help in establishing the hierarchical 
structure that prevailed at the time that the acts under investigations were committed’ (Mitrakas & Zaich, 
2009, p. 164 and 173 ). The chain of custody aims to guarantee that the data has not be tampered with 
between its creation and its usage in court. The main objective is to prove the data are directly connected 
to the suspect, so that the court can judge based on reliable evidence, this means evidence is collected in a 
manner that protects civil liberties. To avoid issues, evidence must be safeguarded at all times from the 
moment of the collection to the trial. 
The chain of custody is relevant for the purpose of the admissibility of evidence, although how this 
admissibility is regulated and dealt with may vary from Member State to Member State and depend on the 
different kinds of data. For instance, in some Member States compliance with the chain of custody in the 
case of flow metadata is only important for the evaluation of evidence, however in the case of content 
data to be used for forensic examination compliance with the chain of custody is relevant for the 
admissibility of evidence (Home Office, 2014). It should be noted that, in the latter case, there is usually no 
specific rule of inadmissibility for the violation of the chain of custody. The inadmissibility of the evidence 
derives from the fact that the violation of the chain of custody can be traced back to one of the general 
causes of inadmissibility of the evidence provided by the rules of a state. 
4.2.6 Diversity of legal frameworks between Member States and the timing of the investigative 
cooperation between Member States 
In cross-border cases, the investigative cooperation between the different Member States is characterised 
by some challenges due to the variety of legal system and legal provisions. In addition, the instruments 
made available for such cooperation might not yet be sufficient to respond in a timely way to a request for 
a prompt collection of the e-evidence that, as mentioned, is volatile and by nature easy to manipulate and 
destroy. There is also the European Investigation Order (Directive 2014/41/EU), which can be issued by any 
Member State: the receiving Member State is required to execute the order. It can also be used for the 
collection of electronic evidence. There is also a proposal for the regulation on European production and 
preservation orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters, which would allow any Member State 
judiciary to request e-evidence directly from service providers (electronic communication providers, 
providers of information society services and IP and domain registries). 
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 Cultural challenges 
From the online survey and from the interviews conducted for this report it emerged that cultural 
challenges also impact the cooperation between CSIRTs and LE and their interaction with the judiciary. 
Some interviewees affirmed for instance that the main difficulty is to make some judiciary personnel 
understand the technical language of the CSIRT and to make the CSIRT understand the legal importance of 
some technical aspects. It seems that the three communities have different approaches to problems and 
modus operandi and they speak different ‘languages’: CSIRTs have a technical approach to problems, while 
judiciaries have a legal approach. The LEAs have to relate with these two different mentalities and 
languages and ‘mediate’. Other interviewees highlighted that the cultural challenges related to how an 
organisation deals with other organisations; for instance, statements such as ‘my job is more important 
than yours’, ‘you have to share because I am the authority’ do not help the cooperation, while having a 
liaison officer (even better with a physical desk available in the other organisation) helps a great deal. 
Also, the level and focus of training vary and the opportunities for CSIRT-LE-judiciary joint training are 
limited. Nevertheless, training provides insights to other disciplines that might be required in 
interdisciplinary environments, such as when there are interactions across technical and legal domains. 
Building on the development of this capability can be seen as a suitable approach (ENISA, 2018, p. 26). 
An ENISA report on Cybersecurity culture guidelines: Behavioural aspects of cybersecurity is currently under 
preparation and expected to be published on the ENISA website by end of 2018 or beginning of 2019. 
 Technical challenges 
Some technical challenges faced in the cooperation between CSIRTs and LE and their interaction with the 
judiciary are discussed below. 
4.4.1 Validation of the digital forensic tools 
Digital forensics encompasses tools and techniques aiming to recover any element of data on a device, 
whether it has been deleted or not. Digital forensics was introduced in police investigation with the advent 
of the digitalisation of enterprises in financial cases to recover deleted evidence such as accounting 
documents and data. It is a specialised field that not all IT personnel might be familiar with (IT staff are not 
always familiar with the requirements on acquiring the evidence). Digital forensics is mainly linked with the 
system and network fields at a very basic level: the inner structure of a hard-drive or the artefacts left by 
network operation in the core of the operating system or live physical memory. 
The tools and methodologies that digital forensic experts use need to be validated. The forensic tools fall 
under national standards in order to produce evidence that is likely to be admissible in court, such a 
standard was developed by NIST and was the first to be designed, using a testing protocol for hardware 
and software (NIST, 2018). The philosophy behind the validation of a tool belongs to the scientific 
experimentation field. To be validated, a tool must provide results that are repeatable and reproducible. 
‘Repeatable’ means using the same method(s), on the same item(s), using the same equipment, by the 
same operator, within a short interval of time, must lead to the same results. ‘Reproductible’ means that 
using the same method, on the same items, in a different laboratory, by a different operator, utilising 
different equipment, must lead to the same results. An indicative example is the Cyber Observable 
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eXpression (CybOX TM) (22) that has helped with standardising, storing and sharing digital forensic 
information; CybOX TM represents objects and relationships that are common in forensic investigations. 
No international standard is currently in place and each country has discretion as to what is admissible in 
court and what is not. What is at stake for the Member States is to have evidence admissibility in computer 
forensics, therefore a validation system for forensic methods and tools that are adapted to the each legal 
framework is needed. 
4.4.2 Different technical maturity levels across different communities 
As of today, the level of technical maturity differs from country to country and across the judiciary. For 
resource reasons, some LEAs might still lack the automation level that would allow for information to be 
processed and exchanged more efficiently. LE and the judiciary are gradually engaging in digitalising their 
processes and bringing them to a higher level of technical expertise. 
4.4.3 Lack of common tools, tools for automated or semi-automated transfer of the data, and 
coordination tools 
Arguably the most important challenge is the cybersecurity aspect: LE IT networks tend to be isolated 
ones. This is due to the critical nature of the information stored in the LE system. To avoid taking too many 
risks, LE IT management tend to choose to have very limited channels with the outside network. LE use 
isolated networks that simply prevent them sharing information with the outside world due to technical 
restrictions (proxy, lack of open IPs). This however makes information exchange, from a technical point of 
view, very difficult. 
While the need for information sharing between the CSIRT and LE communities has started to be 
addressed by tools such as MISP, there is no one tool in place, other than email, to help the coordination 
between the two when dealing with a case (LEAs) or an incident (CSIRTs). For example,  a structured data 
and automation inducing tool could be used by LE to mark specific resources (IP addresses, web domains, 
etc.) as being under investigation and therefore CSIRTs would know to avoid interference with those 
resources in the incident-resolution phase. 
4.4.4 Taxonomy-related challenges 
It must be noted that ‘creating’ a taxonomy is not a simple task. When dealing with topics such as security 
incidents, there can be different ways in which to classify them, and it is not always easy or possible to 
determine which is the best or the most correct classification. Organisations defining  taxonomies are 
usually driven by different needs, and since different CSIRTs have different expectations, teams often end 
up developing their own incident classifications for internal use. In fact, the common taxonomy for LE and 
CSIRTs is itself an adaptation of the Portuguese National Cybersecurity Centre’s CERT.PT (CERT.PT, 2018) 
taxonomy, which is itself an adaptation of the European CSIRT Network eCSIRT.net movie taxonomy 
(Stikvoort, 2012). One main advantage of the common taxonomy for LE and CSIRTs for its use in the 
context of cybercrime is that it has been extended to include the mapping of the incident classifications 
with a legal framework. Similarly, there have been a number of taxonomies that are in essence a branch or 
                                                          
(22) Cyber Observable eXpression (CybOX): https://cybox.mitre.org/ 
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modification of another (GitHub, n.d. a) (ENISA, 2018). With the goal of reaching a consensus on a 
reference security incident classification taxonomy, ‘ENISA and the European computer security incident 
response team (CSIRT) community have jointly set up a task force’ (GitHub, n.d.). Taxonomies are generally 
seen by national CSIRTs, LE and competent authorities as the most suitable way to deal with cybercrime 
classification matters; this view has also been supported by an ENISA study (23). 
LE and prosecutors need to associate the incidents with the provisions and typology of crimes in their legal 
framework. It is essential for them to assess whether a fact (e.g. a cyber incident) can be qualified as a 
crime. The judicial system normally does not use any taxonomy: at this stage, the event will have to fit into 
the criminal code provisions. Choices will be made on a legal basis and investigation strategy. It is essential 
for CSIRT personnel to be trained to identify cyber incidents that qualify as a crime and have the ability and 
be duly authorised to report to the judiciary and/or LE in view of a potential investigation. A common 
taxonomy can become purposeful in this regard as it is relatively easy to understand by CSIRTs (because 
they can just look at the incident from a technical standpoint) while allowing LE and the prosecutors and 
judges to make the appropriate associations with the provisions in the criminal code. 
Some CSIRTs have developed a taxonomy which connects categories of incidents to the offences in the 
criminal code and that help and support the interaction across the three communities. Indeed, such 
taxonomies propose a way of handling each incident, specify the evidence that may be relevant and 
therefore should be preserved by the CSIRT and provide additional information about procedural 
measures that can be used by LE and judiciary to request and obtain relevant evidence. Also the common 
taxonomy for law enforcement (21) is linked with the main international and European legislations: ‘any 
incident categorised in this taxonomy can be matched to the relevant and appropriate legislative 
framework and subsequently mapped to relevant national legislation’ (Europol: European Cybercrime 
Centre and ENISA, 2017, p. 5). 
A common taxonomy has added a lot in efficiency and to the extent that it also covers internal processes 
of CSIRTs, LEAs and the judiciary, all parties could better familiarise themselves with the language used by 
the other collaborating communities. This is likely to increase the rate of adoption across all communities. 
 
 Organisational challenges 
Some organisational challenges faced in the cooperation between CSIRTs and LE and their interaction with 
the judiciary are presented here as identified according to the data collected for this report 
4.5.1 Need for reciprocal understanding of the structures, roles and strengths 
CSIRTs, LE and judiciary have different structures and roles. If CSIRTs have a light hierarchical system based 
on operational matters, LE and judiciary organisations in comparison are much more hierarchical. 
Although with some simplification we can say that; the CSIRT role is to mitigate an incident and get the 
system back on track, the LE role is to find who committed the crime and collect the evidence, the 
                                                          
(23) Common taxonomy for law enforcement and the national network of CSIRTs: https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/common-
taxonomy-for-law-enforcement-and-csirts 
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prosecutor role is to coordinate the investigations and bring the suspect to court if there are the conditions 
for it, the judge role is to decide on whether the accused has committed the crime and the sanction based 
on the evidence provided. 
Different structures and different roles might create some friction between those involved: LE might want 
to wait and collect as much evidence as possible when the CSIRT might want to clean the system as quickly 
as possible and get it back up and running. CSIRTs might want quick responses, while LE and the judiciary 
need to be in a position to take certain formal steps to provide a response and comply with certain legal 
requirements whose fulfilment might take some time. 
What could also help enhance the cooperation and the interaction is a reciprocal understanding of 
strengths. There is therefore a need for a reciprocal understanding across the CSIRT, LE and the judiciary 
communities. This is a necessary element for a better cooperating and interaction. 
4.5.2 Digital forensics expertise and the digital forensics training 
‘The exponential growth of digital traces, as well as the expansion of cybercrime, and digitisation of 
investigative methods represent signiﬁcant changes to society and lead to a broadening horizon of digital 
investigation (Casey E. , 2017)’ (Henseler & van Loenhout, 2018, p. 78). 
The digital forensics activities require expertise in: ‘data collection, data examination and data analysis. 
Data collection involves the correct preservation and copying of digital data sources. Data examination 
relates to the investigation of copies of digital data sources to ﬁnd ﬁles, fragments etc. without 
interpreting the resultant ﬁndings in the context of the case. Data analysis involves the analysis, 
reconstruction, interpretation and qualiﬁcation of the evidence which is obtained from the digital data 
sources’ (Henseler & van Loenhout, 2018). There are, of course, police officer specialists in digital forensic 
investigations who are trained (24) and well-prepared to conduct digital investigations. However, since 
there are multiple areas that need to be covered in digital investigations it is unlikely that all of those areas 
are known to a single expert or to a team of experts: Windows forensics, Linux/Unix forensics, OS X 
forensics, mobile forensics, virtualisation/containerisation etc. While police forces cooperate and exchange 
expertise, in some cases there is a need to request some expert external support. CSIRTs are sometime 
therefore called to provide this technical expertise on some specific cases. 
Although the use of concepts of (factual) witnesses, expert witnesses and forensic experts in different legal 
cultures vary. For the purpose of this study, we can understand a factual witness as an individual who 
knows specific facts about the case that could be important for the purpose of the criminal investigation. 
So, a factual witness could be a CSIRT member who knows what happened in the CSIRT constituency. An 
expert witness, on the other hand, is a specialist on a particular body of knowledge, who can provide 
valuable expert information to LE and the judiciary. So, the expert witness could be, for example, a 
member of a CSIRT who knows nothing about the case at hand, but can explain to the investigator, 
prosecutor or the court what specific digital evidence proves or does not prove. From the perspective of 
the procedural criminal law, the status of the factual witness and the expert witness is generally no 
different. The difference is in the nature and quality of the testimony provided. 
                                                          
(24) Police officer training might mix internal and external/private courses. Depending on the country and the recruitment policy, these courses can begin 
from scratch to train neophytes or be opened only to selected officers who already have a solid background in the subject. 
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Any specialist in a particular body of knowledge may become an expert who fulfils the established criteria 
and, depending on the country, gets enrolled in the official register of forensic experts in given scientific 
fields. The nature of these criteria varies considerably across countries. In some jurisdictions, only the 
court decides whether or not the expert meets the criteria, in others the expert must be accredited or 
must hold a licence granted by an independent body, elsewhere the expert must be a member of a 
professional organisation. In any case, only forensic experts can provide expert opinions which serve as 
specific evidence in court. Expert opinions and their processing also have a much more formal character 
compared with expert witness testimonies, and the responsibility of the forensic expert for the quality of 
their opinion is higher and usually specifically legally regulated. 
Experts need to be chosen based on their skills and experience. Depending on the legal system, different 
levels of verification of the expert’s skills maybe needed. In some systems CSIRTs might need to be 
accredited and included in a specific register of digital forensics experts or a register of court experts to be 
in the position to provide support during  criminal investigations and  criminal proceedings (judges and/or 
the prosecutor may also appoint one or more digital forensics expert to evaluate some aspects of digital 
evidence). In addition, sometimes it seems that there is some confusion regarding the skills and the role of 
digital forensics: an engineer or a computer scientist is not always an expert in digital forensics. 
The difference in education (mainly technical education for CSIRTs, mainly technical/legal education for LE 
and predominantly legal education for the judiciary) might represent a challenge in their communication 
and way of approaching the same matter. However, what might be seen as a challenge should also be seen 
as an enabling factor and an element of enrichment especially in the context of the expertise exchange and 
joint training. 
In addition, the recent rise in cybercrime has shown the limits of the forensic training: cybercrime requires 
knowledge in almost all IT fields: systems, networks, programming, live memory, and electronics (the 
Internet of Things (IoT). Digital forensics training for CSIRTs personal, LE and the judiciary needs to address 
these new challenges, but sometimes the resources available for training are not sufficient to respond to 
needs which are in constant development. 
As emerged from the online survey, it seems that to have joint training for CSIRTs, LE and the judiciary is 
considered as important or very important. 
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Figure 19 — Replies to question 13A of the online survey conducted for this report 
 
According to the data collected, the joint training should address inter alia cooperation between CSIRT, LE 
and the judiciary, digital collection, evidence analysis, digital evidence handling and the drafting of detailed 
reports to be used in criminal courts. 
Figure 20 — Replies to question 14 of the online survey conducted for this report 
 
It is important that the CSIRTs are adequately trained to also handle the kinds of information that are 
usually not useful for responding to an incident, but that could become e-evidence in a criminal trial. 
The digital forensics experts, including CSIRTs when they are called to support criminal investigations (and 
evidence evaluation in criminal proceedings), must normally fulfil specific legal conditions and guidelines 
while collecting or assisting in the collection of evidence (see below). 
Q14: 
Which 
topics 
should 
joint 
Q13A: How important is/would be to have 
joint training for CSIRTs, law enforcement and 
judiciary? 
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Figure 21 - Replies to question 7 of the online survey conducted for this report 
 
 
In some countries there are codes of practice from the forensic regulators that stipulate that all providers 
of digital forensics services to the criminal justice system must be accredited according to certain 
standards (on registration requirements for forensic experts see also: (Henseler & van Loenhout, 2018, p. 
80). In some countries, the validation process however appears to be rather complicated. For instance, 
forensic experts may be required by law to demonstrate professional qualifications, but it might happen 
that there is no official body to set or examine these qualifications. The president of each court therefore 
decides what the necessary qualifications are for forensic experts, and so the quality of experts in each 
court may vary. Also, due to strict requirements on qualifications, in some countries, it might be 
complicated or even impossible for members of CSIRTs to become forensic experts. In these cases, the only 
way would be to call the member of the CSIRT as a witness instead of as a forensic expert. 
The duties, powers and function of the forensic expert are often different from those of the witness. The 
differences vary from one Member State to another. For example, there may be cases of incapacity and 
incompatibility or even conditions of abstention or disqualification of witness when the requirements are 
different from those provided for the forensics expert. 
Investigators must carry out investigations in full compliance with various legal guarantees. Some of them 
are also important in the context of CSIRT involvement. In particular, they are: the presumption of 
innocence (Council of Europe, n.d., p. 9), the impartiality in the conduct of investigations (on this topic, see 
for instance (OLAF Supervisory Committee, 2010), the reasonable duration for investigations, and the 
confidentiality of investigations. 
 
From the online survey and from the interviews conducted for this report it emerged that cultural 
challenges also impact the cooperation between CSIRTs and LE and their interaction with the judiciary. 
Some interviewees affirmed for instance that the main difficulty is to make judiciary understand the 
technical language of the CSIRT and to make the CSIRT understand the legal importance of some technical 
Q7 – Do personnel of CSIRTs - in particular of national/governmental CSIRTs - need 
to adhere to specific legal conditions and guidelines while collecting or assisting in 
the collection of evidence in support of an investigation? 
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aspects. It seems that the three communities have different approaches to problems and modus operandi 
and they speak different ‘languages’. Without resorting into generalisations, it could be simply stated that 
CSIRTs have a prevalent technical approach to problems, while the judiciary obviously have a strict legal 
approach. The LE have to relate with these two approaches and even languages used. 
Also, the level and focus of training vary and the opportunities for CSIRT-LE-judiciary joint training are 
limited (25). 
                                                          
(25) Cybersecurity culture guidelines: Enhancing CSIRT/LEA community (provisional title) is currently under preparation and expected to be published on the 
ENISA website by end of 2018 or beginning of 2019. 
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 Conclusions and recommendations 
 Conclusions 
Using the analysis of the results collected from the desk research, the interviews with subject-matter 
experts, and the online survey, the conclusions summarised below were drawn. 
5.1.1 CSIRTs interact much more with LE than with the prosecutors and they interact very rarely with 
the judiciary 
Usually, CSIRTs interact with LE that, in turn, interact with prosecutors. The CSIRT rarely interacts directly 
with prosecutors. Even more rarely the CSIRT interacts directly with judges. As a result, LE often act as a 
link between CSIRTs and judiciary. CSIRTs and LE mainly have technical training while the judiciary has legal 
training. LE also plays a fundamental role of link between subjects who have different training and use 
different languages. 
5.1.2 CSIRTs support law enforcement (as well as prosecutor and judge) in a criminal investigation 
The CSIRT technical background can provide a valuable support to criminal investigations, CSIRTs often 
have the tools and experience of incidents that allow them to quickly deal with these incidents more 
efficiently. In addition, CSIRTs can have data (e.g. IP addresses, web domains) that may be very important 
for the investigations. Therefore, the CSIRT support activity for LE and/or prosecutors can be fundamental 
to identify who committed or is going to commit a crime. Moreover, depending on the national legal 
system, the CSIRT personnel can sometimes play the role of forensic expert or witness during a criminal 
trial. 
5.1.3 There are legal provisions on CSIRTs and LE cooperation and their interaction with the judiciary 
The diversity of legal systems is likely to shape the cooperation between CSIRTs and LE as well as their 
interaction with the judiciary. However, the implementation of European Directives and the application of 
European regulations are helping to reduce these differences between states. Regardless of the 
differences between legal systems, the data collected via the interviews show that mutual trust is still a 
key factor for effective cooperation between CSIRTs and LE and for effective interaction with the judiciary. 
5.1.4 The understanding of whether CSIRTs have to report to/inform LE and/or prosecutor of 
suspicious criminal activities could be improved 
Depending on the Member State, the CSIRTs may be obliged or not obliged to report an event. In any case, 
CSIRTs usually report crimes to LE and only rarely to prosecutors. From the data collected it emerged that 
overall the understanding of whether CSIRTs have to report to/inform LE and/or prosecutor of suspicious 
criminal activities could be improved. However, it seems that the practical experience and good relations 
between CSIRTs and LE help CSIRTs comply with their legal obligations. 
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5.1.5 There is need for a more extensive usage of information from CSIRTs in criminal investigations 
and as evidence in court 
As emerged from the desk research and from the interviews, CSIRTs can play an important role in fighting 
cybercrime; however, (at least as emerged from the results of the online survey) the frequency of usage of 
information from CSIRT for criminal investigations and proceeding is low. It seems therefore that the usage 
of the information that CSIRTs have and that might be key for responding to (cyber) crime could be 
extended at least in frequency. 
 
5.1.6 There is need to collect data in order to support cooperation in a data driven approach 
As emerged during the desk research, the data available at the moment in area of CSIRT, LE and judiciary 
cooperation are still quite limited. No evidence was found during the data collection for instance of the 
existence of a central repository of data associated with investigations that involve all three communities. 
It is important to collect more data in order to support the cooperation and the decision-making processes 
at supranational and national level, but also at the level of the CSIRT, LE and judiciary teams involved in the 
cooperation. On evidence-based policymaking see (Commission on evidence-based policymaking, 2017). 
Having central repositories of data associated with investigations that involve all three communities, if 
based on suitable metrics, could break new ground in the understanding of the interactions and priorities 
and possibly make the investigation and prosecution more effective. 
5.1.7 Cultural limitations can be noted in the cooperation across the three communities and an 
interdisciplinary approach might help 
Cultural differences across the three communities exist. If these cultural differences are factored in, the 
information flow is hindered, and the cooperation becomes more difficult. While a data driven approach is 
quite desirable, understanding the human and cultural aspects is important as well in order to gain 
appropriate insight (ENISA, 2016, p. 18).  
Sometimes the differences in culture are due to the fact that most of the members of the three 
communities (CSIRTs, LE and the judiciary) have different backgrounds. For this reason, an interdisciplinary 
approach that values all relevant fields of knowledge (namely legal and technical) is key to enhance 
cooperation this can also be addressed through training and experience building. 
Sharing experiences and looking at the information flow from all three community perspectives helps 
understand potential, needs and priorities across the three communities. 
 Recommendations 
According to the data collected via the online survey, joint training, regular meetings and feedback on the 
information provided/shared are suggested to be the best ways to improve the information flow and 
interaction across the three communities. See Figure 22. 
Figure 22 — Replies to question 13 of the online survey conducted for this report 
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Some recommendations have been formulated based on the data collected for this report (see below). 
5.2.1 Collect data on cooperation and interaction across CSIRT, LE and the judiciary 
The data available on the cooperation and interaction across CSIRT, LE and judiciary communities are quite 
limited. Such data are key to enhancing the cooperation and interaction and to support related decision-
making processes. 
While the Member States, and in particular national/governmental CSIRTs, LE and judiciary, would collect 
the data at national level, ENISA, EC3 and Eurojust could support this data collection by suggesting data 
collection methodologies and methods, providing samples of questions and some common definitions of 
key concepts, proposing metrics, indexes and data report templates. Data collected at national level could 
be then aggregated by ENISA at EU/EFTA level. 
Recommendations 
 National/governmental CSIRTs, LE and the judiciary: to collect data on cooperation across the three 
communities. 
 ENISA, EC3 and Eurojust: to support the data collection. 
 ENISA: to aggregate at EU/EFTA level the data collected at national level. 
5.2.2 Build on shared experience at strategic cooperation level 
To have at national and EU/EFTA level, even possibly beyond, a common plan for the cooperation may help 
enhance the cooperation. Sharing experience at strategic cooperation can be a first step towards this. 
Recommendations 
 National/governmental CSIRTs, national LE and the judiciary: to share at national as well as at 
EU/EFTA level their experience at strategic cooperation. 
 ENISA, Europol EC3 and possibly Eurojust: to facilitate, within the EU/EFTA and beyond, the sharing of 
experience at strategic cooperation across the three communities. 
Q13: What are your 
suggestions to improve 
the information flow and 
the interaction across the 
CSIRT, law enforcement 
and judiciary 
communities? 
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5.2.3 Invest in CSIRT/LE/judiciary joint training and skills development 
Joint training across CSIRTs, LE and the judiciary would help share existing practices but would also allow 
the development of collaborative approaches for the future. 
Good training plays a central role in improving the cooperation, including communication of CSIRTs, LE and 
the judiciary; joint training should therefore be facilitated. 
There should be common understanding of legal and technical matters, including of the challenges faced 
by one or more than one of the three communities. An example of topics is provided in Annex D — 
Examples of topics for csirt/le/judiciary joint training. 
There should be joint exercises based on real-life scenarios and hands-on sessions, where CSIRTs, LE and 
the judiciary can practice jointly fighting cybercrime in order to better know each other’s objectives and 
needs, especially what type of information each of them needs to do their job. The joint training might be 
also an opportunity to further understand the potential that CSIRTs have (e.g. information, contacts, 
expertise) for the criminal investigations. 
Organising training at a regional level (e.g. for countries with similar legal systems or with other 
commonalities) as well as engagement, for the joint training, with leading CSIRTs and national police forces 
beyond the EU could be considered. 
It is important to develop the awareness that such training is necessary. Therefore, CSIRTs, LE and the 
judiciary should provide training to their personnel and joint training should not be perceived as 
occasional, but instead scheduled at regular intervals. In addition, it is important to ensure the quality of 
training through the involvement of highly qualified individuals and the use of suitable material (some 
freely accessible material is for instance available on the ENISA site (ENISA, n.d.c). 
Recommendations 
 National/governmental CSIRTs and national LE training centres: to organise CSIRT-LE-judiciary joint 
training. 
 ENISA, Europol EC3, Eurojust and CEPOL: to facilitate joint training at EU and EFTA national level for 
CSIRTs, LE and the judiciary and engage with leading CSIRTs and national police forces beyond the EU, 
as appropriate. 
 CSIRTs, LE and the judiciary: to provide the training requirements to the facilitators of the joint 
training. 
5.2.4 To reach a better mutual understanding of the other communities and develop memoranda of 
understanding to facilitate cooperation/interaction 
Mutual understanding of roles, strengths but also of needs and limitations is key for the cooperation and 
interaction across the CSIRT, LE and judiciary communities. 
Communication and regular meetings between the three communities help reach this mutual 
understanding. Also feedback on the information provided and shared or on how the requests for 
information have been formulated would help to further enhance the mutual understanding. 
In order to support the three communities to reach a better understanding of each other duties assigned 
by the roles each community plays, a SoD matrix (see an example in Annex E — Example of segregation of 
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duties matrix) could be drafted at national level. The aim of this matrix is to highlight conflicting or 
overlapping duties performed by one community or more. As shown in the SoD template in Annex E, the 
CSIRTs, LE, judges and prosecutors have to identify the key responsibilities for their communities and then 
link them with the skills required to fulfil these duties. SoD matrices are usually used to ensure compliance 
with laws and regulations. 
In some Member States there are memoranda between LE and CSIRTs and, in some cases, also between 
the three communities (CSIRT, LE and the judiciary). Based on these memoranda of understanding, for 
instance LE and the judiciary are immediately notified by CSIRTs of IT incidents (especially more severe 
ones) and can immediately coordinate their actions with the CSIRTs. This coordination activity reduces the 
risk that CSIRTs may erase significant data just because they are unaware that such data may be critical for 
the solution of a criminal case. 
Developing memoranda of understanding might also help manage expectations in the 
cooperation/interaction and clarify the strengths, need for information sharing of the different 
communities and limitations they might have in sharing the information. 
Recommendations 
 National/governmental CSIRTs, LE and possibly prosecutor services: to work together towards a 
better mutual understanding of strengths, needs and limitations of the three  communities (CSIRTs, LE 
and the judiciary) in relation to the sharing information, also by using SoD matrices. 
 National/governmental CSIRTs, LE and possibly prosecutor services: to develop memoranda of 
understanding to facilitate their cooperation/interaction. 
5.2.5 Place liaison officers 
To establish liaison officers (e.g. national/governmental CSIRT personnel to LE and to prosecutor and vice 
versa) would be beneficial not only for trust-building knowledge but also for reaching a better reciprocal 
understanding of the three communities and for facilitating the information flow. 
Also providing that they liaise within the other organisation(s) from an allocated physical space (an office 
that the liaison officer can use if needed) could help not only from the practical side but also to clearly 
affirm and recognise this role. 
Recommendation 
 National/governmental CSIRTs, LE and possibly prosecutor services: to appoint liaison officers to 
facilitate the cooperation and the interaction. 
5.2.6 Use (common) tools to facilitate cooperation and interaction 
CSIRTs, LEs and the judiciary use different types of tools and this is natural given the differences in the 
roles of these communities. One suggestion would be that the CSIRTs and LE (which could then feed the 
information to the prosecutors when needed) have access to a common platform where they can share 
information about threats and those involved in threats, cybersecurity incidents, cyber-attacks and 
associated tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). 
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CSIRTs are rarely called as a witnesses in criminal proceedings; however, when this does occur, court 
information systems to support cybercrime trials by means of presenting digital evidence may help CSIRTs 
better fulfil their role. 
Recommendations 
 National/governmental CSIRTs, LE and possibly prosecutor services: to investigate the possibility of 
having a common platform to share information about threats and those involved in threats, 
cybersecurity incidents, cyber-attacks and associated TTPs. 
 National/governmental CSIRTs, LE and possibly prosecutor services: to investigate how the tools they 
use can be further improved to better receive the information provided by other communities and to 
better formulate their requests for information addressed to the other communities. 
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Annex A: Abbreviations 
Abbreviation Description 
ACPO Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland (United Kingdom) 
AEEC Admissibility of Electronic Evidence in Court project 
CEF Connecting Europe Facility  
CEI Call for Expression of Interest 
CEPOL European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training 
CERT Computer Emergency Response Team 
CERT-EU Computer Emergency Response Team for the EU 
institutions 
CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center (Luxembourg) 
CSIRT Computer Security Incident Response Team 
CSS Cyber Security Strategy 
CSV Comma-Separated Value (format) 
CybOX TM  Cyber Observable eXpression (language) 
DB  Database 
DDoS Distributed Denial-of-Service (attack) 
DG Directorate General 
DNS Domain Name System 
DoS   Denial of Service (attack) 
DPO   Data Protection Officer 
EC3 European Cybercrime Centre (Europol) 
EDPB  European Data Protection Board 
EEA European Economic Area 
EFTA European Free Trade Association (Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
Norway and Switzerland) 
ELO Europol Liaison Office 
EMAS Europol Malware Analysis System 
ENI European Neighbourhood Instrument  
ENISA European Union Agency for Network and Information 
Security 
ENP   European Neighbourhood Policy 
ENU Europol National Unit 
EPAG   EPAG Domain Services GmbH 
EPE Europol Platform for Experts 
EU European Union 
EUCTF European Union Cybercrime Task Force 
Eurojust European Agency for the Enhancement of Judicial 
Cooperation. 
Europol  European Union Agency for Law Enforcement 
Cooperation 
Evidence project European Informatics Data Exchange Framework for 
Courts and Evidence project 
FRA European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation 
gLTD Generic Top-Level Domain 
ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
IcSP   Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace 
IOC Indicators Of Compromise 
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IoT  Internet of Things 
IP Internet Protocol 
IPA Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance  
ISA International Society of Automation 
ISF Internal Security Fund  
ISO International Organisation for Standardisation 
ISP Internet Service Provider 
IT Information Technology 
J-CAT  Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce 
JHA   Justice and Home Affairs Council configuration (Council of 
the European Union) 
LB Liaison Bureau (J-CAT) 
LE Law Enforcement 
LEA Law-Enforcement Agency 
MISP Malware Information-Sharing Platform 
MLA Mutual Legal Assistance 
MS Member State 
n.d. No date 
NCB National Central Bureau (Interpol) 
NIS Network Information Security 
NISD Network and Information Security Directive 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology (United 
States) 
OLAF European Commission European Anti-Fraud Office 
PGP  Pretty Good Privacy 
PoC   Point of Contact 
SIENA Secure Information Exchange Network Application 
SoD Segregation (or separation) of Duties 
TIP Threat Intelligence Platform 
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Annex B: Definitions of the key concepts 
In the context of this report the following definitions, listed in alphabetical order, apply: 
 Challenge refers to ‘a situation that poses difficulties, a situation where one or more than one 
obstacle is present and needs to be overcome/removed, and where determination is required’ 
(Portesi, 2008). Challenges can be legal, organisational, technical, cultural, etc. 
 Communication in most cases refers to the information sharing between different parties, in 
particular CSIRTs, LEs and judiciary. Sometimes the term ‘communication’ is also used in its legal sense 
of ‘policy document with no mandatory authority’ (European Commission (run by), n.a.c), such as the 
Commission Communication on Strengthening Europe’s Cyber Resilience System (European 
Commission, 2016). In a few cases it refers to the transmitted information or — especially when in 
plural — to a system used to transmit the information. Communication is an essential component of 
the cooperation between CSIRTs and LEs. 
 Computer security incident response team (CSIRT) or computer emergency response team (CERT) is 
‘an organisation that studies computer and network security to provide incident response services to 
victims of attacks, publish alerts concerning vulnerabilities and threats, and […] offer other 
information to help improve computer and network security’. At present, ‘both terms (CERT and 
CSIRT) are used in a synonymous manner, with CSIRT being the more precise term’ (ENISA, 2015b, p. 
7) (ENISA, 2015a, p. 12) (ENISA, 2016b, p. 10). 
 Cooperation and collaboration are synonymous in this report. They refer to the joint work — 
especially of CSIRTs and LEs — in their coordination of actions, their reciprocal help and their joining 
efforts to fight against cybercrime. 
 Criminal courts are courts in which criminal cases are tried and determined in order to appropriately 
punish offenders. 
 Criminal investigation or crime investigation refers to the process of collecting (and preserving) 
evidence to be used to ascertain a fact that might be considered as a criminal activity and determine 
who is responsible for it. Normally this process starts when the suspected criminal activity is reported 
to the LE (or to the prosecutor depending on the country), or when the LE or the prosecutor become 
otherwise aware that such fact has been or is going to be committed and/or closed. The definition of 
criminal investigation might somehow vary from country to country; a definition of crime 
investigation can be found in (United Nations Office and Drugs and Crime, 2006, p. 1). 
 Criminal proceedings refer to proceedings aiming to ascertain if a crime has been committed and who 
committed it. The adjective ‘criminal’ is used to distinguish them from other kinds of proceedings, 
such as civil, administrative and disciplinary, which have different aims and are governed by different 
rules. 
 CSIRTs network is the network established by the Article 12 of the NIS directive (European Parliament 
and Council of the European Union, 2016e) ‘to contribute to the development of confidence and trust 
between the Member States and to promote swift and effective operational cooperation’. It is 
composed of EU Member States’ appointed CSIRTs and CERT-EU. The European Commission 
participates in the network as an observer. ENISA is tasked to actively support the CSIRTs cooperation, 
provide the secretariat and active support for incident coordination upon request. 
 Cybercrime is an umbrella term. An unequivocal definition of cybercrime does not exist. In general, 
we refer by it to ‘Any offence where the modus operandi or signature [which refers to ‘the mental and 
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emotional motivations” (Geberth, 1995)] involves the use of a computer network in any way’ (Casey E. 
, 2004, p. 667). Cybercrime includes both crimes where computer is an object (e.g. illegal access to an 
information system) or a tool (e.g. storage of illegal images on a computer device or usage of a 
computer to plan a murder) of crime. It must be noted that ‘While many aspects of cybercrime are 
firmly established, other areas of cybercrime have witnessed a striking upsurge in activity, including 
attacks on an unprecedented scale, as cybercrime continues to take new forms and new directions’ 
(Europol, 2017). 
 Cultural aspects refer to the dimensions of the CSIRT-LE cooperation and their interaction with 
judiciary that relate to culture. ‘Culture shapes our identities, aspirations and how we relate to others 
and the world’. ‘The challenges are significant. Cultural diversity is an asset for the EU, but linguistic 
and cultural differences lead to (…) fragmentation’ (European Commission, 2014a, p. 3). 
 EFTA: the European Free Trade Association (EFTA, n.d.) is the intergovernmental organisation of 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. 
 Electronic evidence (or e-evidence) refers to ‘evidence stored in electronic form […] consisting in 
stored subscriber data, access data, transactional data and content data’ (European Commission, 
2018, p. 38). 
 EU Member States are the states that are part of the European Union. At present (status: 26 October 
2018), there are 28 Member States (EU-28). In alphabetical order, they are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom (Europe Union, 2018). 
 Governmental CSIRTs are teams whose constituency are the public administration networks. 
Currently ‘in the EU, governmental CSIRTs are typically used to protect the cyberspace of 
governmental institutions including critical infrastructure [- more precisely, following NIS Directive 
(European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2016e) and its Annex 2, the Operator of 
Essential Services -] as well as to ensure cyber-crisis management” (ENISA, 2015c, p. 9). 
‘Governmental CSIRTs [indeed] mainly manage crisis and provide response to cyber threats and 
incidents concerning the public sector, but in many cases also the critical infrastructures, and in 
limited cases also the private domain, which however is usually within the remits of other CSIRTs in 
the private sector. […] In some Member States, governmental CSIRTs have coordinating and 
supervision functions for other relevant stakeholders, which proves to be a useful practice, especially 
in those Member States where the response mechanism to cyber- attacks is quite complex, and/or a 
significant number of different CSIRTs both in the public and the private sector co-exist in parallel” 
(Council of the European Union, 2017, p. 66). 
 Information sharing refers to ‘the exchange of a variety of network and information security related 
information such as risks, vulnerabilities, threats and internal security issues as well as good practice’ 
(ENISA, 2010, p. 9). 
 Incident is ‘any event having an actual adverse effect on the security of network and information 
systems’ (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2016e). 
 Incident handling refers to ‘all procedures supporting the detection, analysis and containment of an 
incident and the response thereto’ (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2016e). 
 Interaction refers ‘a mutual or reciprocal action or influence’ (Collins Dictionary). 
 Judges refers to a person who is in charge of a court of law and who makes final decisions. 
 Judiciary is the ‘entirety of courts and judicial authorities in a state or in another sovereign. 
organisation such as the European Union (EU). The main task of the courts is to resolve legal disputes 
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and to ensure that the law is applied correctly and coherently’ (European Commission, n.d.). Judiciary 
in this report refers both to prosecutors and judges (similar approach taken in (Council of the 
European Union, 2017). 
 Law enforcement (LE), law-enforcement agencies (LEAs), police and police agencies are terms used 
in this report are synonymous and used to refer to police and police agencies, also used as 
synonymous. For this report, ‘law enforcement’ does not encompass prosecution services and courts, 
which are referred to in this report as ‘judiciary’. LE usually fulfil the following missions: general 
police, investigation, public order and security state missions (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2018). 
 Legal aspects refer to the dimensions of the CSIRT-LE cooperation and their interaction with judiciary 
that relate to the rules and policies shaping and governing it, including obligations, discretion, 
prohibition to share information in their effort to fight against cybercrime. 
 National CSIRT is a CSIRT that ‘acts as national point of contact (PoC) for information sharing (like 
incident reports, vulnerability information and other) with other national […] CSIRTs in the EU 
Member States and worldwide. National […] CSIRT can be considered as ‘CERT of last resort’, which is 
just another definition of a unique national PoC with a coordinating role. In a lot of cases a national 
[…] CSIRTs also acts as governmental […] CSIRT. Definitions may vary across the EU Member States’ 
(ENISA, 2009, p. 8). A ‘crucial role in monitoring and responding to cyber incidents is played by the 
national CSIRTs that the majority of the Member States have already established’ (Council of the 
European Union, 2017, p. 12). Requirements and tasks for CSIRTs are listed in Annex I of the NIS 
Directive (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2016e). 
 Network and information system refers to ‘(a) an electronic communications network […]; (b) any 
device or group of interconnected or related devices, one or more of which, under a program, 
perform automatic processing of digital data; or (c) digital data stored, processed, retrieved or 
transmitted by elements covered under points (a) and (b) for the purposes of their operation, use, 
protection and maintenance” (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2016e). 
 Organisational aspects refer to those dimensions of the CSIRT-LE cooperation and their interaction 
with judiciary that relate to steps taken, procedures followed, resources available, etc. in their 
cooperation to fight against cybercrime. 
 Practices refers to ‘something that is usually or regularly done, often as a habit, tradition, or custom’ 
(Cambridge University Press, n.d.). 
 Prosecutors: refers ‘a legal official who accuses someone of committing a crime, especially in a 
[criminal] law court’ (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.). ‘The public prosecutors’ office or prosecution 
service […] is regarded as part of the judiciary in many Member States’ ’ (European Commission (run 
by), n.d.(b)). Also, for this report prosecutors are considered as part of the judiciary. 
 Taxonomy ‘is defined as a classification of terms. Three characteristics define a taxonomy: 
o a form of classification scheme to group related things together and to define the relationship 
these things have to each other; 
o a semantic vocabulary to describe knowledge and information assets; and 
o a knowledge map to give users an immediately grasp of the overall structure of the knowledge 
domain covered by the taxonomy, which should be comprehensive, predictable and easy to 
navigate’ (ENISA, 2016a , p. 7). 
‘There is currently no consensus on concepts and definitions related to taxonomies’ (ENISA, 2016a , p. 
5). 
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 Technical aspects refer to the dimensions of the CSIRT-LE cooperation and their interaction with 
judiciary that relate to the tools (e.g. applications, the platforms) and the methodologies used to 
share information in their effort to fight against cybercrime. 
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Annex C: An overview of legal systems, areas of law, and legal 
traditions (common law and civil law) 
Each Member State has its own laws and rules that govern the various facets of social interaction. The set 
of all these laws and rules constitutes a legal system. 
A legal system is divided into areas, such as: private law (which includes the civil law in the sense of the law 
related to civil wrongs as opposite of criminal law which relates to crimes), public law, international law, 
European law, criminal law (the law related to crimes), and criminal procedure. Every legal system has 
elements that characterise all areas of law within that system. Depending on the legal system, the same 
area of law (for example, criminal procedure) can be disciplined differently. On some specific matters, 
however, the Member States might have the same legislation, or a very similar one, either since they come 
from a similar legal tradition or because the matter is regulated at EU level. 
The national legal systems can be divided into two main groups: the civil law systems (26) and the common 
law systems. Some countries have mixed legal systems of civil and common law. Most Member States of 
the European Union base their legal system on a codified civil law. Nordic legal tradition is generally 
consider as belonging to civil law tradition but with some own characteristics (27). Member States with 
common law system include United Kingdom, Ireland and Cyprus and a mixed legal system can be found in 
Malta. The European Union law is based on the treaties and mixes civil law with an attachment to the 
importance of case-law of the European Court of Justice. As seen in Figure 23, the map provides an 
overview of the different legal traditions in the EU and in EFTA. 
The civil law systems derive from Roman law. These systems represent the legal systems of continental 
Europe and those that derive from them. Even though individual civil law systems may vary widely both in 
procedure and substantive law, there are common features, the main one being that its core principles are 
codified into a referable system, which serve as a primary source of law. 
The common law systems derive from the juridical tradition developed in England (United Kingdom) in the 
Eleventh Century. Common law systems are English law, the United States law and those derived from 
them. The main feature of common law systems is that the body of law is derived mainly from judicial 
decisions of courts. The following main two differences should be mentioned between civil law and 
common law systems: 
 These two groups of legal systems attribute a different role to judgments. Only in common law 
systems a case-law is considered not only as a source of law, but as a source of law of primary 
importance. In the common law system, judges therefore have an active role in developing rules. 
Instead, in a civil law system a case-law is not a source of law. 
                                                          
(26) The term ‘civil law’ has two meanings. It may refer to the non-criminal branch of law in a common law legal system, and to the continental law originating 
in continental Europe and based on Roman law. In this study by ‘civil law system’ we mean the latter, the legal system based on continental legal tradition. 
(27) ‘The Nordic countries lack a general civil code and are using a system of less comprehensive statutes supplemented by analogies from 
statutory provisions, case-law and legal doctrine filling the gaps’ (Berniz, p. 28). 
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 In the common law systems, the judge, except cases, must comply with what was decided by previous 
judgments. In civil law systems the precedent can be important, but it is never binding for a new 
decision and, in any case, it is not a source of law. 
The difference between the different legal traditions and legal systems influences considerably the area of 
criminal procedural law (described below) and so the interaction and information flow with the different 
players namely, as far as concerns this report, the CSIRT, LE and the judiciary. 
Figure 23 — Map Showing the Different Legal Traditions in the EU and EFTA (created with mapchart.net) 
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Annex D: The WHOIS registry 
Most of the 21 subject-matter experts interviewed for this report expressed the opinion that, while the 
GDPR has an impact on the publicly availability of certain WHOIS data used for the criminal 
investigations/incident handling, in principle this has not impacted the way CSIRTs and LE cooperate. 
However, several interviewees highlighted that because of the fact that the GDPR is applicable only as of 
25 May 2018, it is difficult to make a complete assessment of the changes or possible changes that might 
occur. 
One of the WHOIS legitimate use indeed is for criminal investigations and incident managing (ICANN, 
2018d). Domain names are essential for criminals to run their infrastructures and malicious campaigns 
online. They need domains for getting sensitive information from internet users (Phishing), to spread 
malicious software or to send Spam to internet users. Even though criminals use fake or stolen identities to 
register domain names most of the time, these identifiers are invaluable for detecting and preventing 
internet crime that depends on domain names, like any legal online business. 
On 25 May, the international law-enforcement community and the CSIRT communities have lost direct 
access to personal data on registrants of domain names. This is having a very strong negative impact both 
on criminal investigations online and on the security and defence of networks in general and represents a 
challenge for LE and for the CSIRT community in the performance of their tasks. Therefore, timely access to 
what is now non-public WHOIS information (without court order) should be ensured for both the LEA 
community and the CISRT. 
LE now need to initiate formal legal process and MLA to obtain relevant information. This comes with a 
substantial administrative burden as well as long delays (28). The delays involved in obtaining WHOIS data 
from registries, registrars and lower-level providers through formal legal process may be much longer than 
the period for which the data in question is being retained. By the time formal procedures are concluded, 
the data may therefore no longer exist. This is significantly harming the public interest and has severe 
negative consequences for the rule of law online. 
For the CSIRT community the situation is worse because they do not have the mandate to request a court 
order so they are dependent on the goodwill of registries and registrars to access the information. 
ICANN community is currently trying to agree on a Unified Access Model to non-public WHOIS information 
for entities which have a legitimate need (public interest). It is absolutely essential that both LEA and CSIRT 
have this direct access because of their function. 
Usage of WHOIS for Incident Handling and for Criminal Investigations 
The ‘WHOIS is indispensable to the smooth operation of the DNS’ but it also ‘used for many [other] 
legitimate purposes, including: 
                                                          
(28) EJCN statement on WHOIS database reform - WK 6398/2018 INIT – 29 May 2018. 
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 To establish or look into an identity in cyberspace, and as part of an incident response following an 
internet or computer attack (security professionals and law-enforcement agents use WHOIS to 
identify points of contact for a domain name.) 
 ‘To gather investigative leads (i.e. to identify parties from whom additional information might be 
obtained). Law-enforcement agents use WHOIS to find email addresses and attempt to identify the 
location of an alleged perpetrator of a crime involving fraud’ (ICANN, 2018d). 
WHOIS and GDPR compliance 
Some preliminary considerations should be made when addressing the WHOIS and its compliance to the 
GDPR: 
 The GDPR has been applicable as of 25 May 2018. 
 The GDPR builds on existing principles, such as the principle of lawfulness, fairness and transparency, 
principle of purpose limitation and the principle of data minimisation. 
 The GDPR concerns personal data on individuals, not to legal entities. 
 In the context of the WHOIS some personal data, but not only personal data, are processed. 
 As discussed above (see Section 3.2.2.1) the GDPR does not apply to the processing of personal data 
‘by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution 
of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the 
prevention of threats to public security’. The data protection law enforcement directive applies 
instead. 
 The legitimacy and the importance of access to WHOIS data for public policy purposes (firstly LE) is 
uncontested. 
 LEs have a clear interest in having access to data in the WHOIS register when it is necessary for their 
investigations; reason why some access procedures should be designed to ensure that LE can obtain 
WHOIS data, not publicly available, within an appropriate time frame for the investigation (European 
Commission, 2018). 
 The issue of the WHOIS and its compliance to protection of personal data rules was discussed also 
well-before the GDPR has started to become applicable: the ‘EDPB [European Data Protection 
Board]’s predecessor, WP29 [Working Party Article 29], has been offering guidance to ICANN on how 
to bring WHOIS in compliance with European data protection law since 2003’ (European Data 
Protection Board, 2018a). 
 With the approaching of the GDPR applicability and now that the GDPR is applicable, this discussion 
seemed to have become more intensive. 
Some recent developments of this discussion include: 
 A dialogue within ICANN and between ICANN and the main stakeholders to find viable solutions to 
have a GDPR-compliant WHOIS while enabling legitimate uses by relevant stakeholders (including LE 
and CSIRTs) as well as unpublished WHOIS data. For instance, ‘As work is ongoing within ICANN to 
make this database compliant with data protection rules, in particular the general data protection 
regulation [GDPR], the Commission sent a letter (European Commission, 2018) to ICANN on the dual 
objectives of ensuring quick access to its directories for public interest purposes whilst being fully 
compliant with EU data protection rules. The ICANN Government Advisory Committee, in which 
national governments and the Commission are represented, voiced its concerns and called on ICANN 
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to ensure continued access to the WHOIS, including non-public data, for users with a legitimate 
purpose.’ (European Comission, 2018). The European Commission in its ‘Technical input on proposed 
WHOIS Models on behalf of the European Union.’ (European Commission, 2018) made observations 
on the different proposed models to provide access by LE to certain WHOIS is data not publicly but 
necessary for them for the performance of their task. Also the EDPB in its letter of 5 July 2018 
provided ICANN with guidance to enable ICANN to develop a GDPR-compliant model for access for 
legitimate purposes to personal data that are processed in the context of WHOIS but are not publicly 
available (European Data Protection Board, 2018b). 
 The development of technical solutions (e.g. logging to access non-public WHOIS data) as well as of 
accreditation programmes ‘allowing full access to non-public WHOIS data for LE and other legitimate 
third parties (IP Rights, cybersecurity, etc.)’ (ICANN, 2018e). See for instance the Draft accreditation & 
access model for non-public WHOIS data (ICANN, 2018f). 
 The recent court case of ICANN before German Courts (29), requesting an injunction against an 
accredited registrar to reinstate the collection of all WHOIS data required under the their registrar 
accreditation agreement: the registrar had stopped to collect some of these data (e.g. administrative 
and technical contact information) when selling new domain name registrations because believing 
                                                          
(29)Below are summarised the main steps of this court case (status: 9 August 2018): 
 17 May 2018: effective as of 25 May 2018 (starting date of GDPR applicability), ICANN adopted Temporary Specification for gTLD 
Registration Data (ICANN, 2018g), which ‘establishes temporary requirements to allow ICANN and gTLD registry operators and registrars 
to continue to comply with existing ICANN contractual requirements and community-developed policies in light of the GDPR’ (ICANN, 
2018g). 
 25 May 2018: ‘The internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) […] filed injunction proceedings against EPAG, a 
Germany-based, ICANN-accredited registrar […]. ICANN has taken this step to ask the court for assistance in interpreting the European 
Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in order to protect the data collected in WHOIS. ICANN's "one-sided filing" in Bonn, 
Germany, seeks a court ruling to ensure the continued collection of all WHOIS data, so that such data remains available to parties 
demonstrating legitimate purpose to access it, consistent with the GDPR’ (ICANN, 2018h). 
 29 May 2018: the Regional Court of Bonn decided that ‘it would not issue an injunction against EPAG. In rejecting the injunctive relief, 
the Court ruled that it would not require EPAG to collect the administrative and technical data for new registrations. However, the 
Court did not indicate in its ruling that collecting such data would be a violation of the GDPR’ (ICANN, 2018i) (sentence in German: 
(ICANN v. EPAG Domainservices GmbH, 2018) - non-official translation to English: (ICANN v. EPAG Domainservices GmbH, 2018b). 
 13 June 2018: ICANN appealed against the ruling of the Regional Court of Bonn to the Higher Regional Court of Cologne, Germany, and 
‘again asked for an injunction that would require EPAG to reinstate the collection of all WHOIS data required under EPAG's Registrar 
Accreditation Agreement with ICANN’ (ICANN, 2018c) (Appeal in German – Appeal in English non-official translation: 
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-icann-v-epag-immediate-appeal-redacted-13jun18-en.pdf ) 
 21 June 2018: ‘the Regional Court in Bonn, Germany, decided to revisit its ruling in the injunction proceedings, which it has the option 
to do upon receipt of an appeal (https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2018-08-03-en) 
 18 July 2018: ‘the Regional Court [of Bonn] decided not to change its original determination not to issue an injunction against EPAG, and 
referred the matter to the Higher Regional Court in Cologne for the appeal’ 
 3 August 2018: ICANN announced that the ‘German appeal court (Appellate Court of Cologne) has issued a decision on the injunction 
proceedings ICANN initiated against EPAG, a Germany-based, ICANN-accredited registrar that is part of the Tucows Group. The 
Appellate Court has determined that it would not issue an injunction [emphasis added] against EPAG. In making its ruling, the Appellate 
Court stated that the interpretation of the GDPR was not material to its decision, so there was no obligation to refer the matter to the 
European Court of Justice’ [emphasis added]’ (https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2018-08-03-en) 
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that the collection of that particular data would be in violation of the GDPR; ICANN with this court 
case also aimed to seek assistance on the GDPR interpretation. It must be noted that on 
3 August 2018 the Appellate Court has determined that it would not issue such injunction and in 
making its ruling, ‘the Appellate Court stated that the interpretation of the GDPR was not material to 
its decision, so there was no obligation to refer the matter to the European Court of Justice’ (ICANN, 
2018c). 
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Annex E: Questionnaire to support the subject matter expert 
Interviews 
The questions below have been prepared to support the interviews with subject-matter experts to collect 
data for drafting an ENISA report on ‘Current cooperation between CSIRT and LEA community and on 
possible ways to further enhance their cooperation’ (provisional title: ‘The Interplay between CSIRTs, Law 
enforcement and the judiciary in the fight against cybercrime: Closing the cycle’). This report contributes to 
the implementation of Output O.4.2.2 (Support the fight against cybercrime and collaboration between 
CSIRTs and LEAs) of the ENISA’s Programming Document 2018-2020 (link: 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/corporate-documents/enisa-programming-document-2018-
2020). The report is expected to be published by end of 2018. 
ENISA selected some external experts from the List of NIS Experts compiled following the ENISA call for 
expression of interest (CEI) (Ref. ENISA M-CEI-17-T01) to support the data collection and drafting of this 
report. In addition to desk research and an online survey (planned), the data collection is done also via 
interviews with subject-matter experts. 
The expected duration of the interview is 1 hour. 
Some of the questions below are common to CSIRTs, LEAs and judiciary (judges and prosecutor), while 
others are tailored to CSIRTs, LEAs and judiciary. 
For information regarding how your personal data are processed, see the privacy statement below (after 
the questions). 
For more information regarding this questionnaire and the report, please contact: CSIRT-LE-
cooperation@enisa.europa.eu 
Interviewer: 
Date of the interview: 
Name of the interviewee: 
Affiliation: 
Position: 
Country: 
QUESTIONS COMMON TO CSIRTs/LEAs AND JUDICIARY (PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES) 
1. What is your organisation legal basis? 
2. What types of cyber incidents/cybercrime cases does your organisation deal with? (e.g. denial of 
service (DoS), phishing, unauthorised access, etc.) 
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3. Does your legal framework (i.e. the legal framework you are subject to) support the cooperation 
between CSIRT/LEA and the interaction/information flow with the judiciary (prosecutors and judges) 
in cybercrime proceedings and in general in responding to cybercrime? How? 
4. What kinds of information does your legal framework allow and require you to share and with which 
subjects (CSIRT, Law-Enforcement Agencies (LEAs), judges and prosecutors as applicable)? 
5. How often do you share information with your counterparts (CSIRTs, LEAs, prosecutors and judges as 
applicable) during the incident handling/investigation? 
6. As far as it concerns cybercrime cases, could you briefly describe the information flow/interaction 
between CSIRT — national and governmental in particular — LEAs, prosecutor and judge? 
7. Do you think that the interaction and the information flow CSIRTs/LEAs and judiciary (prosecutors and 
judges) work well? 
8. What do you believe to be the most challenging aspects of this interaction/information flow? 
9. Which aspects of this interaction/information flow you may be able change and/or improve? 
10. Which of these aspects are out of your control? 
11. Are you aware of the GDPR and any potential impact it may have on how you work with other 
organisations? 
12. How would you see joint training for CSIRTs, LEAs and judiciary (prosecutor and judges)? Which topics 
should they cover? 
13. When there is a disclosure (Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure) of a newly discovered vulnerability 
in either hardware, software or a service are you aware of any cooperation or coordination between 
CSIRTs, LEAs and Judiciary for sharing the CVD. 
 
CSIRT SPECIFIC QUESTIONS (TO BE ASKED ONLY TO CSIRTs) 
1A. What kind of CSIRT team do you represent (e.g. national, government, private sector, regional, 
sectoral)? 
2A. Are there situations/cases where you decide to advise the victim in your constituency to contact the 
LEA? Do you follow a specific procedure to determine when it is appropriate to advise the victim to 
contact law enforcement? 
3A. Does your legal framework require you to inform LEA of identified activities that may be considered a 
crime? 
4A. Are there situations/cases where you decide to contact the LEA? Do you follow a specific procedure to 
determine when it is necessary to inform the LEA? 
5A. How do you think CSIRTs and LEAs could avoid duplication of efforts? 
6A. What kinds of information that is relevant to criminal investigations is available to you? 
7A. Who and on what basis decides that identified activity may be considered a criminal offence? 
8A. What information do you advise the victim to provide or you provide to the LEA when reporting a 
criminal offence? 
9A. How do you exchange information with the LEA? (offline, online, verbally…) 
10A. Does your legal framework allow you to inform LEA of identified activities that may be considered 
a crime? Are there any limitations on the scope of information that you can share voluntarily with the 
LEA? 
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11A. Can you be called as a witness / expert in criminal proceedings? Does it happen often? Is this the 
only occasion where you get directly in contact with the prosecutor and with the judge in cybercrime 
cases? 
12A. Are there any challenges in your information sharing/interaction with the LEAs? If yes, which kind 
of challenges you encounter (e.g. legal, organisational, cultural, technical)? 
13A. Does the GDPR changes your way to get and process information? (Question to be asked only if not 
yet covered by reply to Question 11) 
14A. Does the GDPR changes your way to interact and sharing data with the LEAs? (Question to be 
asked only if not yet covered by reply to Question 11) 
15A. Are there any challenges in your information sharing/interaction with prosecutors and judges? If 
yes, which kind of challenges you encounter (e.g. legal, organisational, cultural, technical)? 
 
LEA-SPECIFIC QUESTIONS (TO BE ASKED ONLY TO LEAs) 
1B. Are you familiar with the CSIRT-type structures in your country and the technical capabilities that they 
have? 
2B. What kind of CSIRT do you work with the most (e.g. national, government, private sector, regional, 
sectoral)? 
3B. Do you have designated points of contact from/for your national / governmental / (other type) of CSIRT? 
4B. Which kind of support do you request from CSIRTs? 
5B. In what kind of investigations do you request CSIRT technical expertise? 
6B. Does the CSIRT report to you criminal offences? Does the CSIRT help the victims in its constituency 
report criminal offences? 
7B. Can you exchange data with CSIRTs? If yes, with which CSIRTs, which kinds of data and under which 
circumstances? 
8B. What are the specific challenges you encounter (legal, organisational, technical, cultural)? 
9B. What is to your point of view the added-value of information sharing and cooperation with the 
CSIRTs? 
10B. In cybercrime cases, does the prosecutor meet the CSIRT? And does the judge meet the CSIRT? If 
so, on what type of occasion? Only where CSIRT representative is witnesses / expert in court? 
11B. Are CSIRT representative sometime witnesses in court? Under which circumstances? 
12B. Does the GDPR changes your way to interact with CSIRTs? And to get information via other 
channels (including data basis)? (Question to be asked only if not yet covered by reply to Question 11) 
13B. Do you practice multilateral cooperation at supranational level with CSIRTs (through 
Europol/ENISA)? 
 
JUDICIARY (PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES) SPECIFIC QUESTIONS (TO BE ASKED ONLY TO JUDICIARY) 
1C. What data transmitted by CSIRTs is the most often used as evidence in a criminal trial? 
2C. Have you ever had problems in a criminal trial with admissibility or usability of data received from 
CSIRTs? Could you give an example of such problems? 
3C. What criteria must the data provided by a CSIRT meet to be admissible as evidence in criminal 
proceedings? 
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4C. Have you ever had legal constraints in asking CSIRT for data? If so, what were the constraints? 
5C. Do you approach CSIRTs directly or via the LEA? 
6C. Does a LEA need court order to request data from the CSIRT for the purposes of criminal 
investigation? Always? Under which circumstances? 
7C. In cases where data belongs to foreign CSIRTs, how do you approach them? 
8C. When do you use the letter rogatory, when the European Investigation Order, and when the 
Convention of 29 May 2000 on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of 
the European Union to request data in criminal proceedings? 
9C. Have you ever given up asking for data from a foreign CSIRT because you thought it was too difficult 
to get? 
10C. Is it a problem for you that the IP address is kept for different times by CSIRTs of different 
countries? 
11C. Have you had a request for data refused by a CSIRT of your country? And by a CSIRT from another 
country? If so, on what basis? 
12C. Can a CSIRT representative be summoned in criminal proceedings as a witness or as an expert? 
13C. What are the specific challenges you encounter when you interact with CSIRTs (legal, 
organisational, cultural, technical)? 
QUESTIONS ON MENTIONING OF NAME, AFFILIATION, AND COUNTRY 
 Do you agree on having your forename, surname, affiliation and country mentioned in the report 
(Note: it is not confirmed whether names of interviewees will be mentioned in the report)? 
 Do you agree on having your forename, surname, affiliation and country mentioned in the 
acknowledgements of the report? (NOTE: it is not confirmed whether names of interviewees will 
be mentioned in the acknowledgements of the report)? 
 Do you agree on having stated in the report that information on your country has been collected 
via an interview with a CSIRT/LE/judiciary (prosecutor/judge) representative? 
 
———————— 
 
Privacy Statement — ENISA Report on CSIRT-LE cooperation 
 
Your personal data shall be processed in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council (OJ L8 of 12.1.2001, p1) on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such 
data. [1] 
The data controller of the processing operation is ENISA Core Operations Department. 
The legal basis for the processing operation is: 
o Article 5(a) of Regulation 45/2001/EC[2] based on Article 3(b)(v) of the Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013, repealing Regulation (EC) No 460/2004[3], 
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stating that one of ENISA’s tasks is: to ‘support voluntary cooperation among competent public bodies, 
and between stakeholders’. With the view of contributing to the fulfilment of such task and according to 
the ENISA Programming Document 2018-2020 as approved by Management Board in Decision No 
MB/2017/11[4], ENISA is drafting a report on ‘Current cooperation between CSIRT and LEA community and 
on possible ways to further enhance their cooperation’ (see Output O.4.2.2 — Support the fight against 
cybercrime and collaboration between CSIRTs and LEA); or 
o Article 5(d) of Regulation 45/2001/EC based on the consent of the data subject. 
The purpose of this processing operation is to collect data via an online survey and some subject-matter 
interviews for the drafting of the ENISA report on ‘Current cooperation between CSIRT and LEA community 
and on possible ways to further enhance their cooperation’. 
The following personal data are collected for the respondents of the online survey and of the interviews. 
a. Contact data: name, surname, community they belong to (e.g. CSIRT, LE, prosecutors, judges, etc.), 
position, affiliation, country, email address, phone number (optional). 
b. Knowledge-related data: While participating in the online survey and by replying to the questions 
during the interviews a respondent may produce data, for example data related to his or her knowledge 
and analysis in the field of information security. 
The recipients of the data will be designated ENISA staff involved in the data collection and drafting of the 
report, and some external experts, selected by ENISA from the ‘Call for Expressions of Interest — List of 
NIS Experts’ [5], supporting ENISA with the data collection and the drafting of the report. Only when explicit 
written consent is provided by the data subject, name, surname, affiliation, country, might be included in 
the acknowledgements of the report that is expected to be published in December 2018. The data may 
also be available to EU bodies charged with compliance monitoring and inspection tasks. 
While the online survey will be conducted by using the EU Survey tool [6], the interviews with subject-
matter experts will be conducted face-to-face, over the phone, via skype or with other means to be 
agreed with the interviewee. 
Personal data will be kept up to a maximum period of one year after the publication of the report, expected 
to be published in December 2018. After the end of this period, the contact data will be manually deleted. 
However, knowledge-related data are kept by ENISA beyond this period in an anonymised form (without 
linking to contact data) for future ENISA projects. 
You have the right to access your personal data, the right to correct any inaccurate or incomplete personal 
data and the right to delete your data. Knowledge-related data will be kept in anonymised form (without 
linking to contact data). If you have any queries concerning the processing of your personal data, you may 
address them to the ENISA staff working on this report at CSIRT-LE-cooperation@enisa.europa.eu. 
You shall have right of recourse at any time to the ENISA data protection officer (DPO) at 
dataprotection@enisa.europa.eu and to the European Data Protection Supervisor at 
https://edps.europa.eu. 
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[1] http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=32001R004
5&model=guichett 
[2] Whereby the processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest 
on the basis of the Treaties or other legal instruments adopted on the basis thereof. 
[3] http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:JOL_2013_165_R_0041_01&qid=1397226946093&from=EN 
[4] https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/corporate-documents/enisa-programming-document-
2018-2020 
[5] https://www.enisa.europa.eu/procurement/cei-list-of-nis-experts 
[6] https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/home/welcome 
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Annex F: Questions in the online survey 
Brief survey for 2018 ENISA Report on CSIRT-LE cooperation 
 
This short online survey has been prepared by ENISA, in conjunction with external experts, to support the data 
collection for the ENISA report on current cooperation between CSIRTs (computer security incident response 
teams) and law enforcement and their interaction with the judiciary (prosecutors and judges). 
This report contributes to the implementation of ‘Output O.4.2.2 — Support the fight against cybercrime and 
collaboration between CSIRTs and LEA’ of the ENISA Programming Document 2018-2020, in particular to what 
is foreseen as publication on ‘Current cooperation between CSIRT and LEA community and on possible ways to 
further enhance their cooperation’. 
All questions are with closed answers but some free text boxes are also included in order to allow the 
respondents to add additional comments/information if they wish to do so. 
The estimated time to complete this survey is maximum 15. 
For information on personal data processed within this specific survey, please download the following privacy 
statement: (The privacy statement is omitted from this report)  
For information on personal data processed by the EUSurvey service itself, please click here. 
For any questions related either to this survey or to ENISA projects in the area of CSIRT and law enforcement 
cooperation, please contact: CSIRT-LE-cooperation@enisa.europa.eu 
 
*Name and surname 
 
 
*Organisation 
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*Country 
Please select 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic [Czechia] 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Liechtenstein 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Norway 
OTHER 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
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Please specify OTHER country 
 
*Which community are you from? 
Please select one answer 
CSIRT 
Law enforcement 
Both CSIRT and law enforcement (e.g. from CSIRT seconded to law enforcement or vice versa) 
Prosecutors 
Judges 
Other 
 
Please specify 
 
1. How often in your country is information provided by CSIRTs — in particular national/governmental CSIRTs 
— used for criminal investigations [1]? 
Please select one answer 
Often 
Occasionally 
Rarely 
Never 
I do not know 
 
[1] By ‘criminal investigation’ we refer to the process of collecting (and preserving) evidence to be used to ascertain or prevent a fact or facts that 
might be considered as a criminal activity and determine who is responsible for it. 
2. How often in your country is information provided by CSIRTs — in particular national/governmental CSIRTs — 
used as evidence in criminal proceedings in court? 
Please select one answer 
Often 
Occasionally 
Rarely 
Never 
I do not know 
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3. In your country, how often are national/governmental CSIRTs called to write detailed expert reports to use in 
criminal proceedings in court? 
Please select one answer 
Often 
Sometimes 
Hardly ever 
Never 
I do not know 
 
4. In your country, how often national/governmental CSIRT is called as witness in criminal proceedings in court? 
Please select one answer 
Often 
Sometimes 
Hardly ever 
Never 
I do not know 
 
5. In your experience what kind of data provided by CSIRT is most often used for criminal investigations? 
Select one or more answers 
IP ddresses 
Indicators of compromise (IOC) (malware information, file hashes, mutex, etc.) other than IP addresses 
Personal information other than IP addresses 
Timeline of events 
Reconnaissance detection indicators prior to infection 
Details on personas/accounts on social networks / darknet places 
Information that supports proper coordination (e.g. information related to cases already monitored) 
Malicious campaign and context information 
Information on potential victims and/or attackers (e.g. credit card data obtained after taking down a 
phishing website) 
Decryption keys in cases of ransom attacks 
Information on the modus operandi of the attackers 
Details about specific cases CSIRTs are dealing/dealt with 
Statistics and reports on cases CSIRTs dealt with and on trends 
Other 
Please specify 
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6. In your experience what kind of data provided by CSIRT is most often used as evidence in criminal 
proceedings in court? 
Select one or more answers 
IP addresses 
Indicators of compromise (IOC) (malware information, file hashes, mutex, etc.) other than IP addresses 
Personal information other than IP addresses 
Timeline of events 
Reconnaissance detection indicators prior to infections 
Details on personas/accounts on social networks / darknet places 
Information that supports proper coordination (e.g. information related to cases already monitored) 
Malicious campaign and context information 
Information on potential victims and/or attackers (e.g. credit card data obtained after taking down a 
phishing website) 
Decryption keys in cases of ransom attacks 
Information on the modus operandi of the attackers 
Details about specific cases CSIRTs are dealing/dealt with 
Statistics and reports on cases CSIRTs dealt with and on trends 
Other 
Please specify 
 
7. Do personnel of CSIRTs — in particular of national/governmental CSIRTs — need to adhere to specific legal 
conditions and guidelines while collecting or assisting in the collection of evidence in support of an 
investigation? 
Yes 
No 
I do not know 
 
Please use the box below to provide more information on conditions or guidelines that CSIRT personnel need to 
adhere to while collecting or assisting in the collection of evidence in support of an investigation? 
 
8. In your country, have the national/governmental CSIRT a duty to inform the victim of a suspected cybercrime? 
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Please select one answer 
Yes, always 
No, never 
It depends 
 
Please specify 
 
9. Have the national/governmental CSIRT in your country a duty to report cybercrime to the law enforcement? 
Please select one answer 
Yes, always 
Yes, but only in specific cases (e.g. serious cases) 
No, it does not have a duty but he can report 
No, it cannot report, it can only inform the victim and advice the victim on how to report 
I do not know 
Other 
 
Please specify 
 
9A. To whom does the national/governmental CSIRT in your country report cybercrime? 
Please select one answer 
To the law enforcement (police) 
To the prosecutor directly 
Either to the law enforcement or to the prosecutor depending on the case 
Other 
 
Please specify 
 
10. In your country who takes the lead in criminal investigations? 
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Law enforcement (police) 
Prosecutor 
Judge (e.g. magistrate in charge of preliminary investigations) 
It depends 
Other 
 
Please specify 
 
Please specify 
 
11. Does the interaction and the information flow across CSIRTs, law enforcement and judiciary (prosecutors and 
judges) work well? 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Partially agree (e.g. it works but can improve) 
Disagree 
There is no interaction 
I do not know 
 
12. Are there any challenges hindering the interaction and information flow across CSIRTs, law enforcement and 
judiciary (prosecutors and judges)? 
Please select one or more answers 
Organisational 
Legal 
Technical 
Cultural 
Other 
 
Additional comments, if any 
Please use this box for any additional information/comment you might wish to provide us with 
 
Please specify 
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13. What are your suggestions to improve the information flow and the interaction across the CSIRT, law 
enforcement and judiciary communities? 
Please select one or more answers 
Joint training 
Common tools (e.g. access to same platforms) 
Common taxonomy 
Appointment of liaison officers 
Regular meetings 
Feedback on the information provided/shared 
Memoranda of Understanding 
Other 
 
Additional comments, if any 
Please use this box for any additional information/comment you might wish to provide us with 
 
13A. How important is/would be to have joint training for CSIRTs, law enforcement and judiciary? 
Please select one answer 
Very important 
Important 
Not that important 
Not important at all 
 
Additional comments, if any 
Please use this box for any additional information/comment you might wish to provide us with 
 
14. Which topics should joint training for CSIRT, law enforcement and judiciary cover? 
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Please select one or more answers 
Digital evidence collection 
Digital evidence handling 
Digital evidence analysis 
Drafting detailed reports to be used in criminal courts 
Helping the victim report the crime 
Helping the victim provide useful information for the criminal investigations 
Helping the victim provide useful information to be used as evidence in criminal courts 
Cooperation between CSIRT, law enforcement and judiciary (e.g. synergies, challenges, etc.) 
Other 
 
Additional comments, if any 
Please use this box for any additional information/comment you might wish to provide us with 
 
Please specify 
 
15. What are the strengths that national/governmental CSIRT in your country has and you would wish to see 
more in the law enforcement? 
Please select one or more answers 
Technical skills 
Technical tools 
Agile processes, which requires little formalities, to respond to requests for information 
Consolidated trust relations with their peer in other Member States, which also helps get swift 
responses to request for information 
 Well-established cooperation with the private sector 
 Other 
Additional comments, if any 
Please use this box for any additional information/comment you might wish to provide us with 
 
Please specify
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16. What are the strengths that law enforcement in your country has and you would wish to see more in the 
national/governmental CSIRT? 
Please select one or more answers 
Detective skills 
Knowledge of the chain of custody and requirements for admissibility of evidence in criminal 
proceedings 
Ability to draft detailed reports to be used in criminal courts 
Well-defined role, easy to understand by all parties involved in a case Other 
Additional comments, if any 
Please use this box for any additional information/comment you might wish to provide us with 
 
Please specify 
 
Please use this free text box for any additional information/comment you might wish to provide us with 
 
Thank you very much for your time and your input! 
For any questions related either to this survey or to ENISA projects in the area of CSIRT and law-
enforcement cooperation, please contact: CSIRT-LE-cooperation@enisa.europa.eu 
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Annex G: Examples of topics for CSIRT/LE/judiciary joint training 
Examples of topics for CSIRT/LE/judiciary joint training include: 
 information sharing (including the kind of information to share) 
 information flow 
 obligations and restrictions to the information sharing 
 information tools, including platforms (e.g. MISP) 
 communication channels 
 crime reporting 
 evidence collection 
 digital investigations 
 forensic tools 
 digital evidence and chain of custody 
 procedures e.g. formal request for data, MLA procedures 
 cyber exercises 
 cyber threat intelligence 
 penetration testing 
 vulnerability scanning 
 reverse engineering 
 how to draft reports to be used in court 
 best practices on cooperation. 
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Annex H: Example of segregation of duties (SoD) matrix 
Activities of crime 
CS
IR
Ts
 
LE
As
 
Ju
dg
es
 
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
s 
Training topics 
(e.g. technical 
skills etc.) 
Prior to incident/crime  
Delivering/participating in training Problem-solving 
and critical 
thinking skills 
Issuing recommendations for new 
vulnerabilities and threats 
Knowledge of 
cyber threat 
intelligence 
landscape 
During the incident/crime  
Discovery of the crime Digital 
investigations; 
forensics tools; 
penetration 
testing; 
vulnerability 
scanning 
Identify the type and severity of the 
compromise 
Knowledge of 
cyber threats 
and incident 
response 
procedures 
Evidence collection Knowledge of 
what kind of 
data to collect; 
organisation 
skills 
Providing technical expertise Technical skills 
Preserving the evidence that may be 
crucial for the detection of a crime in 
a criminal trial 
Digital 
investigations; 
forensics tools; 
Duty to report a cybercrime to law 
enforcement (LE) 
Obligations and 
restriction on 
information 
sharing; 
communication 
channels 
Duty to inform the victim of a 
cybercrime 
Obligations and 
restrictions to 
the information 
sharing 
Acting as a single point of contact 
(PoC) for any communication with 
other EU Member States 
Communication 
skills; 
Cooperation between CSIRTs and Law Enforcement: interaction with the Judiciary 
  November 2018  
   
106 
communication 
channels 
Undertake the investigation of an 
incident  
Well-prepared 
& well-
organised to 
react promptly 
in an incident 
Deciding the leads to follow, the 
targets to work on. Identifying the 
legal framework 
Knowledge of 
the legal 
framework; 
decision-making 
skills 
Lead of criminal investigation Knowledge of 
the incident 
response plan; 
leadership skills 
In the case of disagreement, the final 
say for an investigation 
Knowledge of 
the legal 
framework; 
decision-making 
skills 
Post incident/crime  
Systems recovery Technical skills 
Protecting the constituency Drafting and 
establishing 
procedures; 
technical 
knowledge 
Preventing and containing IT 
incidents from a technical point of 
view 
Technical skills 
pertaining to 
system 
administration, 
network 
administration, 
technical 
support or 
intrusion 
detection 
Investigating and judging who 
committed a crime 
Technical 
knowledge and 
knowledge of 
the legal 
framework 
Assess incident damage and cost Evaluation skills 
Review the response and update 
policies and procedures 
Knowledge how 
to draft an 
incident 
response and 
procedures 
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